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Abstract: 
 
The end of the Cold War marked the emergence of three new concepts in international 
relations: (1) state sovereignty could be violated on the basis of the protection of collective 
security, (2) security was no longer viewed merely in terms of military protection and (3) the 
recognition by states that the protection of individuals may require them to give up some of their 
responsibilities to other societal actors. This role has been increasingly filled by civil society, 
specifically by NGOs. Through an analysis of two case studies, the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT) and the Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, this paper will examine the different 
strategies NGOs use to influence state opinion during negotiations.  
The existing literature does little to answer this question, forcing me to look beyond 
traditional international relation theories. In the early phases, NGOs focus on building 
momentum by establishing transnational networks, collecting information, and framing this 
information into reports that will resonate with delegates. This information not only serves as the 
capital necessary for NGOs to gain access to the negotiations, but allows NGOs to “name and 
shame” states into compliance. Furthermore, during negotiations NGOs help to solve the 
principal agent problem by connecting state delegations to their domestic constituents.  
I conclude that the reason the ICBL, relative to the work of AI in the CAT, had such a 
large degree of influence was that the coalition was able to move past the typical interest group 
theory consisting of providing information and lobbying individual delegates. This was achieved 
through three separate means: (1) using a multidisciplinary approach to frame the ban as a 
humanitarian and not a security issue, (2) joining a coalition of like-minded states and, (3) 
moving negotiations outside the traditional disarmament method in the UN. Through these three 
strategies the ICBL was able to counter powerful opposition forces in negotiations.  
	   4	  
Preface 
I’ve finally reached the end of the road in this endeavor, the light at the end of the tunnel 
and whatever other clichés I would normally add in an attempt at eloquence were I not so brain 
dead. Not surprisingly for anyone who knows me, this final section is fairly difficult for me to 
write. I am still trying to understand how I feel about this process; like many college seniors 
before I am trapped in that phase of nostalgia where I am trying to accomplish everything on my 
bucket list (obviously finishing this thesis was rather high up there). Quite frankly, being caught 
up in this whirlwind I probably will not understand the significance of this work until after I 
graduate. So my greatest piece of advice to future thesis writers is the following: do not forget 
why you chose to do this in the first place. Hopefully, it was not just to get honors because to be 
honest while you will probably survive the year it will be miserable. Of course getting honors is 
a major reason, but there are far too many bumps along the road if you merely rely on this 
motivation to get you through. You have to possess a general curiosity about your topic, during 
the many (and by many were going to ballpark it to an average of once a week) tough times 
when I wanted to throw whatever material I was working on against a wall, I would take a deep 
breath and remind myself that at the end of the day, I am actually interested in this material.  
 I suppose it is natural to wonder what interested me about this topic in the first place. I 
have always been interested in human rights; all you have to do is take a quick glance at the 
extracurricular section in my resume to figure this out.  However, most of my focus has been on 
community organizing and local educational efforts. After enrolling in various international law 
classes during my sophomore and junior years, my interests expanded beyond a purely local 
scope. Now I plan on attending law school, and hope to concentrate in international law 
(focusing on humanitarian law).  
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 Ideally, I could see myself working for an NGO in the future. While I wish I could say 
that I want do this because it is the “right thing to do”, this is simply not the case. I need a little 
bit more assurance that the work I will be doing is actually having at least a small impact. This is 
why I wanted to examine the work of NGOs in international negotiations: to see if they could 
actually have influence, or if my efforts would be better concentrated in other fields.  
 There are so many people I need to thank for their help in this process. First, I would like 
to thank Joshua Rubenstein, Dr. Leon Gordenker, Peter Willetts, and Steve Charnovitz for the 
advice they provided me early in the process on how I should tackle this subject. Next, I would 
like to thank both Betsy Pittman and Patrick Stawski for their assistance in finding sources. 
Turning to individuals at this University, I have even more people to thank.  I would like to thank 
Professor Barbara Koremenos for her assistance in helping me to draft my initial proposal. Also, 
I would like to thank Professors Kio Tsutsui and Katherine Morse for their assistance in helping 
to find sources and providing insight on the topic (special thanks to Katherine for showing me 
how to use the microfiche machine; it made me feel like an actual scholar).  
 A big thanks also goes out to Professor Susan Waltz and former Ambassador Melvyn 
Levitsky. The insight you have both provided for this project though interviews and various 
conversations has been invaluable. I am extremely grateful for the time you both took to assist 
me. Ambassador Levitsky, thank you for agreeing to be my third reader. I hope this paper serves 
as the capstone to our discussion throughout the year.  
Next I need to thank the class advisor, Professor Andrei Markovits, for all the time he has 
put into helping each one of us complete our own original work of which we can be proud. The 
department is lucky to have someone who cares so much about undergraduates.  
	   6	  
Finally, thank you to my advisor Professor Jana von Stein. Without your help I would 
still be floundering about throughout this process, I appreciate all the effort and guidance you 
have provided.  
 To my Poli Sci 494 colleagues, thank you. I certainly would not have made it through 
without your support. Probably the most rewarding thing about this process is the friendships I 
have made. I will miss the dinners, including the always-fascinating discussions every week after 
class. 
 To my friends and family, thank you for keeping me sane and putting up with my 
increasingly high maintenance personality. Thank you for listening to my constant complaints, 
proofreading my work, offering words encouragement when needed, telling me to suck it up 
when needed, and most importantly forcing me to still go out and have some fun along the way. 
Nothing I write can truly capture how grateful I am to have all of you in my life. 
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Introduction 
On November 15, 1977, Horacio Guillermo Cid de la Paz, a student at the Colegio 
Nacional, was kidnapped on the streets of Buenos Aires by members of the Federal Argentine 
Police Service for being the leader the Secondary School Students’ Union (UES). He was 
transferred to ‘club atletico’, an infamous concentration camp. There he was held for over 15 
months, and during this time he was repeatedly tortured. For hours he would be beaten over his 
“head, armpits, sexual organs, anus, groin, mouth and all the sensitive parts of his body” with a 
“picana”, which is comparable to a cattle prod.1 Between these sessions his captors would apply 
220 volts of current directly to his body, or subject him to the “pirippi”, a type of noise torture.2 
Almost 2 decades later all the way across the Atlantic Ocean in Bosnia Pero Jakic was 
walking to visit his home that had been destroyed by ethnic conflict. On his way he stepped on a 
hidden landmine in an unmarked field. While Jakic survived, his neighbor and her 17 year-old 
son were killed by the explosion. Jakic was by no means lucky to survive. He lost his leg and 
with that his livelihood. In an instant both of these young men’s lives were changed forever.  
While these two individuals are separated by both time and space, they have one thing in 
common. Both of these men are victims of atrocities, forever connected by a society’s failure to 
protect them from harm. The question is who is to blame for these acts? I would argue that 
ultimately it is up to the state to protect the safety of its own citizens. However, why would a 
state stop this abusive behavior if the government felt that it was in its national interest?  
International law first emerged as a form of governance to deal with the increased amount 
of interaction between states caused by globalization. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
such as the UN were developed to serve as a forum for negotiations between states. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Testimony on Secret Detention Camps in Argentina Pg. 18 
2 Testimony on Secret Detention Campus in Argentina Pg. 18	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early international law focused more upon security and economic concerns such as war and 
trade. Further, it was limited by the overwhelming consensus that the state was seen as a 
sovereign entity and no international authority should have the power to interfere in domestic 
affairs. As such, the individual continued to suffer from abusive behavior, since no state wanted 
to open the door to violating another’s sovereignty by taking action to rectify the situation.  
Elazar Barkan contends that this changed following the end of the Cold War when the 
United Nations (UN) and states were looking to establish themselves in a world that was “paying 
increased attention to moral values.”3 According to Barkan, “the leaders of the policies of a new 
internationalism - Clinton, Blair, Chirac, and Schroder - all have previously apologized and 
repented for gross historical crimes in their own countries and for policies that ignored human 
rights.”4 By admitting their guilt, states have cleaner consciousness and oftentimes even receive 
direct political payout.  
 This admission of guilt, for the first time, led to interaction between the perpetrator and 
the victim, leading to a “new threshold of morality in international politics.”5 I would argue that 
Barkan’s claim is slightly overly optimistic, instead proposing that the end of the Cold War 
marked the time where international stakes were significantly lowered. Human rights were on the 
agenda throughout the Cold War, but they took a distant third behind security and economic 
concerns. This can be seen by the fact that many human rights agreements that established 
standards of abusive behavior emerged during the height of the Cold War. However, I do concur 
with Barkan that towards the end of the Cold War, the public came to the realization that IGOs 
were unable to put a stop to some of the worst human rights disasters. States had failed in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Barkan, Guilt of Nations. 2000. Pg. XVI 
4 Barkan Guilt of Nation. 2000. Pg. XVII 
5 Barkan does express some skepticism recognizing that this new standard is implemented 
inconsistently worldwide (Guilt of Nations. 2000. Pg. XVIII).	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responsibility to protect their citizens; concerns over respecting sovereignty still dominated 
international relations (IR), preventing necessary action. This led to a void; a new political actor 
was needed to pressure states towards promoting and respecting human rights. 
This void has been increasingly filled by civil society, which is comprised of the area 
between the state and the individual. It often acts as a conduit through which the individual can 
interact with their state. The individual has specific needs and interests that may either match or 
conflict with the preferences of other individuals. The Prussian philosopher Freidrich Hegel 
states that eventually individuals in a society will “engage in spontaneous, customary and 
nonrealistic forms of association.”6 Through this process, individuals begin to form groups that 
rally around common interests. To protect interests, these associations then begin to pressure 
both the state and other individuals.7 
One specific component of civil society is non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
NGOs are often difficult to define, because the term is used very inconsistently by different 
states. Furthermore, despite the fact that non-state actors have existed for centuries, the official 
term NGO was not defined until the founding of the of the UN. Peter Willetts defines these non-
state actors as "an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous 
basis for some common purpose other than achieving government office, making money or 
illegal activities.”8 The key difference between a state and an NGO is that an NGO has a 
voluntary relationship with individuals.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ahmed and Potter. 2006. NGOs in International Politics 
7  It is important to note that civil society is not only political; other organizations such as 
corporations, sports clubs, and unions are also a part of civil society.  
8 Willets, Peter. “Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations.” in Conscience of the 
World 
9 NGO, as defined by the UN, will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
Charnovitz, S. 2006. “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law” 
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NGO involvement in human rights agreements dates all the way back to the founding of 
the UN. Article 71 in the UN Charter allows the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to 
consult with NGOs on “matters within its competence”, as long as they meet certain 
qualifications. This leads me to the central question that I will attempt to answer in this paper: 
given that human rights agreements are filled with sovereignty concerns, what are the different 
strategies NGOs use to influence state opinion during negotiations?  
Preliminary research reveals that NGOs were involved in varying degrees in the 
following conventions during treaty drafting negotiations: the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Ottawa 
Convention Banning Landmines (Landmines Convention), the Convention on Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, and the Convention on Rights of the Child (CRC). My advisor Professor Jana 
von Stein and I debated the validity of selecting cases based on the dependent variable of NGO 
involvement in negotiations. We concluded that while it is something to keep in mind, this is an 
acceptable choice considering I will be doing an overall survey of NGO strategies used in each 
case. 
Originally, I was going to examine three different types of cases: (1) congruence, where 
member states and NGOs preferences match, (2a) divergence where preferences only vary 
slightly, and (2b) divergence where preferences differ on almost all key issues. After various 
consultations I concluded this was not the best route for this paper. Steve Charnovitz, a public 
international law scholar, offered the following advice: “there are an array of NGO views on any 
issue and there are an array of state views (assuming a unitary actor which is of course 
unrealistic) so I think it would be difficult to disentangle your 1, 2a, and 2b to match state 
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preferences with NGO views.”10 Peter Willetts concurred, stating that my previous research 
design would have “put NGOs on a different planet.” Instead he recommended looking at cases 
where NGOs “turned a minority of governments into a majority supporting their positions.”11  
From this advice I selected three cases to examine: CAT, CRC and Landmines 
Convention. These cases cover proceedings in the UN from the late 60s all the way to the late 
90s. In the CAT, Amnesty International (AI) played the lead role for a majority of the process. In 
the CRC, smaller NGOs were involved and no major coalition formed. In the Ottawa 
Convention, a coalition known as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (IBCL) formed 
and was led by a steering committee comprised of a group of NGOs.  Finally, each case includes 
different strategies used by the NGOs to sway member state delegations 
However, I eventually narrowed my focus to the CAT and Landmines Convention. The 
primary reason for this was that there were greater commonalities between the two cases, thus 
making it easier to focus on NGOs without being concerned about other issues affecting 
negotiation procedures. Both treaties fall under the new realm of collective and human security. 
The prevention of both torture and landmines depends upon states coming together and 
punishing those who use these techniques within their own borders. Additionally, negotiations 
for the CAT occurred during the height of the Cold War, while negotiations for the Landmine 
Convention occurred either towards the end or following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The 
state of international affairs when these two treaties were being negotiated originally led me to 
theorize that states should be more open to outside influence by NGOs in the Landmines 
Convention.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Email Correspondence with Steve Charnovitz, September 19, 2011. 
11 Email Correspondence with Peter Willetts, September 20, 2011.	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The first chapter will provide a discussion of existing IR theories and how they do not do 
enough to explain the work of NGOs. I theorize that the reason the existing literature on NGOs is 
so convoluted is because theorists are too narrow in their focus: they neglect to realize that 
negotiations are an extremely complex process and therefore the strategies used by NGOs 
change depending on the stage of negotiations. To completely understand the work of NGOs, I 
will turn to literature that is not typically associated with IR. Chapter 2 will discuss the rise of 
human rights in international law, which led to an increased role for NGOs in negotiations.  
Chapter 3 will begin my analysis of my two case studies, providing background before 
turning to a discussion of the work of NGOs during the early awareness raising stage before 
negotiations officially begin. I hypothesize that this is the stage where NGOs can have the most 
independent influence. By forming networks, NGOs can pressure states from the outside. At this 
point, NGOs still have the power to frame an issue to resonate with both the general public and 
individual state delegations. The ability to control the presentation of information is power that is 
typically neglected by the existing literature. 
Chapter 4 focuses upon my first case study, the CAT. At this point, negotiations have 
begun for a final treaty, so this chapter will focus on the controversial sticking point of universal 
jurisdiction in negotiations. Ultimately almost every sticking point in negotiations deals with 
issues of sovereignty. The information that NGOs provide state delegations serves as a moral 
capital that grants them access to delegate’s valuable time. This information assisted in 
propelling negotiations forward and “names and shames” states into compliance. Once inside 
negotiations, NGOs were able to connect state delegations to their domestic constituents. 
Originally, I theorized that once negotiations have begun, NGOs efforts are most successful 
when they attach themselves to a member state with a similar agenda. 
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Chapter 5 examines my second case study, the Landmines Convention. Similar to the 
previous chapter, the Landmines Convention also had a serious sticking point in this case, the 
ban itself. An examination of my second case study revealed the work of the ICBL is much more 
visible then AI’s work in CAT. This leads to the conclusion that they were able to have a greater 
degree of influence over the proceedings. Therefore, the final section will examine the question: 
why were NGOs in the Landmines Convention able to have a greater amount of influence over 
negotiation proceedings than in the CAT?  I conclude that the ICBL was able to move past 
traditional interest group theory as seen in the CAT. There are three main factors that led to this: 
(1) framing the ban as a moral issue, (2) joining a coalition of like-minded member states, and 
(3) moving negotiations outside the traditional disarmament means.  
	   14	  
Chapter 1: Beyond Traditional International Relations Theory 
Before beginning to examine my research question, it is important to discuss different 
schools of thought concerning IR and how they can be applied to the work of NGOs. This will 
not only provide the lens through which this paper will attempt to examine this topic, but will 
also allow the reader to see how different scholars have already tackled this topic.  
 Peter Willets asserts that all IR theories analyze which political actors and which types 
of interactions between them are important to relationships between states (2011). The three 
dominant frameworks in international relations are (1) realists, (2) liberals and (3) 
institutionalists. Realists are focused upon power dynamics in an anarchic international system 
where nation states rely upon themselves for security.12 Therefore, realists see states as unitary 
actors who “define their national interests in terms of maximizing power and security.”13 
International law, which lacks a central enforcement mechanism, is deemed relatively ineffective 
since states will only protect their national interests.  
This contrast with liberals, who believe security is not always the dominant concern. 
Thus, liberals place importance on the activities of other actors, such as NGOs, who operate in 
domestic transnational society.14 Liberals believe states can be influenced by “moral and ethical 
principles, power relations and bargaining among different domestic and transnational groups, 
and changing international conditions.”15 State power matters, but it is exercised in an 
international framework that allows for states to cooperate with one another.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Slaugther, Anne Marie et al. “International Law and International Relations Theory: A New 
Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship.”  
13 Mingst, Karen A and Margaret P Karns. 2007. The United Nations in the Twenty-First Century  
14 Ahmed, S. and David Potter. 2006. NGOs in international politics. 
15 Mingst, Karen A and Margaret P Karns. 2007. The United Nations in the Twenty-First Century 
Pg. 9	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Institutionalists believe that international law is specifically designed to perform 
functions such as signaling, coordination, monitoring and enforcement.16 Institutionalism is very 
similar to rational design theory, which operates under the premise that international cooperation 
is organized in different ways. Rational design theorists conclude that differences among 
international institutions are not random, but a representation of attempts to solve the specific 
cooperation problems between states.17 
Ahmed and Potter assert that these three existing theories cannot explain the role of 
NGOs in IR. Realists tend to ignore NGOs as actors because they are deemed unimportant 
relative to states. Institutionalists are primarily focused on the interactions between governments 
and international law; however, research on how regimes emerge and are maintained often cites 
the role of NGO.18 The closest of the three theories is liberalism, which does at least recognize 
that power relations depend more then states. Ahmed and Potter instead propose that two newly 
emerging theoretical theories, transnationalism and constructivism, may be the most 
comprehensive in explaining the rise of NGOs in civil society and IR.  
Transnationalism attempts to examine IR beyond the scope of interactions between states. 
This framework examines interactions across state boundaries when at least one actor is a non-
state agent who is acting independent of a government. According to this framework, NGOs are 
part of larger community of non-state actors that include: multi-national corporations, epistemic 
communities of scientists and technical specialists, ethnic diasporas, and cross-border terrorist 
and criminal organizations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Slaugther, Anne Marie et al. “International Law and International Relations Theory: A New 
Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship.”  
17 Koremenos, B., C. Lipson, and D. Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International 
Institutions."  
18 Ahmed, S and David Potter. 2006. NGOs in international politics. 	  
	   16	  
Constructivists believe that the international system is not fixed and immutable, so 
communication between actors can over time create common understandings of roles and 
behaviors. These common understandings are referred to as norms.19 Constructivism is the only 
framework to acknowledge that NGOS have the ability to either change or establish new norms 
through persuasion and education. 
While these two theories come closer to explaining NGOs role in IR, they do not capture 
the whole picture. In particular, these theories do little to examine how NGOs can influence 
international proceedings.20 One of the major problems when analyzing the influence of NGOs in 
international negotiations is that NGOs organize in ways that are not typically examined by 
political scientists. They do not possess the typical strengths of states: “sovereignty, territory, and 
coercive capability.”21  To do this, I have to turn to theory that is not in the realm of traditional 
IR literature. 
Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss describe three facets for analyzing the work the 
work of NGOs during a campaign around a given issue: government, strategic, and output.22 The 
government dimension refers to the analysis of state policy and program administration during 
the campaign. Strategic dimensions examine how NGOs interact with intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) and states on policy issues. This approach examines both the normative 
basis for action and the different strategies utilized by NGOs to influence states. The third 
approach, the output dimension, investigates the degree of success within the framework of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A more formal definition of a norm is the explicit or implicit rules specifying what behaviors 
are acceptable within a society.  
20 I define influence in IR as a relationship where one actor causes a change of behavior in 
another (Willets (2011) Non-governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of 
Global Governance.). 
21 Ahmed, S and David Potter. 2006. NGOs in international politics. 
22 Weiss, Thomas G and Leon Gordenker. 1996. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. 	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UN system.  This paper will primarily focus on the strategic dimension by examining the 
different techniques that NGOs utilize during international negotiations. 
Focusing on NGO strategies, there are three relative social theories that can help to 
illuminate how NGOs attempt to influence state delegations during negotiations. The existing 
theories differ on (1) the extent of the role NGOs can play in the negotiation process, and (2) the 
effectiveness of the various techniques used in influencing member states. The first group 
believes that NGOs collaborate to form transnational networks that serve to raise awareness 
about certain issues. Another group looks at NGOs as individual actors and compares them to 
interest groups that lobby state delegations in order to get their preferences expressed in treaties. 
A final group theorizes that the primary role of NGOs in negotiations is to serve as a provider of 
expertise to member states, thereby acting more as a subsidiary to streamline the negotiation 
process.  
The first group examines the collective work of NGOs. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. 
Rikker, and Kathryn Sikkink assert that all transnational collective action involves the interaction 
of NGOs with international norms to create social change. Therefore, the primary goal of 
transnational collective action is to “create, strengthen, implement, and monitor international 
norms.”23 There are various forms of transnational collective action as defined by these authors. 
The first is the transnational advocacy network, which is defined as a set of actors linked across 
state boundaries by a common set of beliefs. Generally, formal organizations (such as the UN 
and its subsidiary organs) form the main nodes in these networks, while NGOs serve as the links 
that communicate between these larger organizations and their domestic constituencies.  
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Through their advocacy efforts during this early agenda-setting phase (also known as 
awareness raising or standard setting), the networks gradually earn the support of the general 
population, and thus the norm begins to gain widespread support. Once negotiations have begun, 
bargaining with states often leads to indirect political participation in international affairs, since 
the domestic coalitions that form these networks now are directly connected to state 
delegations.24 Therefore, one of the most important ways these networks assist negotiations is 
providing voices to groups that were previously absent from the decision making process.25 A 
large part of the legitimacy of NGOs in the international community is based on this 
representation.  
To explain this how these networks operate in IR, Sikkink developed the “boomerang” 
model. Under this framework, when an individual or group cannot obtain access to their 
government (described as a form of blockage), they attempt to obtain outside support from 
NGOs in a different state (State B). The NGOs in State B then pressure their own state 
government and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to apply pressure to State A. Under this 
international scrutiny, State A then bows to the demands of the domestic NGO. The final stage in 
this model is either when the new norm or the newly framed norm is completely accepted and 
internalized in international society. Sikkink uses this model to conclude that that the ability of 
NGOs to lobby for underrepresented populations (often not even in their own states) gives them 
a “moral authority” which they use to influence international proceedings beyond their material 
capacity.  
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These scholars have also examined whether a network can be more effective if it rallies 
around an existing norm, or attempts to establish a new norm. They found that transnational 
networks are most effective in mobilizing where “pre-existing well-institutionalized norms” 
exist.26 Darren Hawkins argues that it is easier to rally around an established cause, and thus 
existing norms act as “pull factor” on NGOs. Furthermore, existing international norms possess 
more legitimacy because in most cases they have been established by states.27As a result, an 
NGO can pressure other actors with the authority of one or multiple states, instead of merely 
championing a cause on its own. 
If a network does attempt to establish a new international norm, Peter Willets concludes 
that it has the most influence during the agenda setting stage because its greatest strength is its 
ability to mobilize transnational public opinion.28 Similarly, networks can often assist 
negotiations by merely bringing together the necessary actors that may be hesitant to join 
negotiations.29 For instance, NGOs have had great success bringing different parties together by 
organizing parallel conferences that coincide with current discussions in the UN. These 
conferences are designed to debate a given issue and to consider how to best present it to the 
relevant UN body. Through these conferences, host NGOs can generate horizontal links between 
economic and social sectors and also vertical links between grassroots organizations and 
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  Willets , Peter. 1996. The Consience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental  
Organizations in the UN	  29	  Goodman, R., and D. Jinks. "How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human 
Rights Law."  
	   20	  
governments. Furthermore, during these conferences NGOs often act negotiators whose main 
function is to harmonize common positions between states on the issue under discussion.30  
Whether the network is building on an existing norm or establishing a new norm, 
ultimately the success of a campaign depends upon its ability to counter its opposition. In 
"Accountability and Effectiveness in NGO Policy Analysis", Jane Covey enumerates the 
characteristics of an effective alliance or coalition. She argues that any alliance needs both a 
coherent campaign strategy, and must possess the necessary resources to influence policy 
makers. To achieve this, alliances must determine the best way to frame an issue in order to 
appeal to grassroots organizations and limit the opposition’s ability to counter-mobilize. 
Generally, networks accomplish this through large education and media campaigns.  These serve 
not only to increase awareness of the issue at hand, but just as importantly to instill the belief that 
change is possible.  This optimism is required to help build commitment to the alliance. 
Other scholars focus on what NGOs can accomplish as individual actors, instead of what 
they can achieve collectively as a group. These scholars compare NGOs to domestic interest 
groups that lobby state governments in order to get their preferences expressed in legislation. 
This framework can be applied to IR, since, once granted access to formal negotiations, NGOs 
and their partner states can attempt to sway opponents towards a treaty that best represents their 
preferences.  There are two schools of thought on the effectiveness of interest groups. The first 
group is slightly more pessimistic about interest groups ability to independently influence states. 
Deardorff and Hall claim that the objective of lobbying is not to change legislators’ minds, but to 
assist allies in achieving their own goals.31 They hypothesize that lobbyists target their strongest 
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allies, since they are more likely to listen to like-minded interest groups.32 Further, they claim 
that interest groups and legislators should cooperate to draft material that would otherwise be 
tabled due to limited time and budgets. In essence, this first group assumes that NGOs are 
dependent on the assistance of like-minded states to influence other governments. 
The alternative perspective examines how interest groups can remedy a principal-agent 
problem where a disconnect exists between a state and its citizens. This occurs because citizens 
(agent) elect officials (principal) to represent their interests in government, but the principal may 
not always understand the preferences of its agents. Interest groups solve this problem by serving 
as the connectors that lobby government officials on behalf of individuals. This framework can 
easily be applied to international law, since a similar disconnect often exists between a state 
delegation in the UN and its domestic constituents.33 This important link is often missing 
because the primary responsibility of delegates is to represent their government. If the link 
between citizens and their government at the domestic level is faulty, this often translates to the 
international level.34  
The principle-agent problem is slightly different from networks ability to represent the 
minority groups in negotiations. This approach looks at how NGOs can connect a single state to 
their own domestic constituents, instead of focusing on connecting underrepresented groups to 
the entire international community within the UN. By participating directly in negotiations, 
NGOs gain an understanding of state delegates’ positions.35 Once this occurs, their connections 
to grassroots organizations and the media allow them to enhance “domestic signaling” by 
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making negotiations more visible and thereby raising domestic audience costs.36 Domestic 
audience costs allow individual constituents to observe and offer their opinion on any given 
issue. Once domestic constituencies become involved it is difficult for state delegations to ignore 
public opinion, pressuring them into certain actions.37 Peter Willets describes this phenomenon 
by stating: “Domestic politics will affect the positions governments advocate in IGOs, while the 
decisions of intergovernmental organizations will feed back into domestic politics.”38  
The next question is what techniques do NGOs utilize to influence states that mimic 
interest groups? Since NGOs do not possess the military capabilities of states or the economic 
resources of interest groups, they primarily rely on softer methods such as persuasion.39 
Persuasion changes the mind of an actor by getting them to reevaluate a certain norm through 
either “social learning” and/or the provision of information.40 Persuasion primarily uses two 
different techniques: (1) framing, and (2) cuing. Framing is how a message is presented to the 
target audience. Sideny Tarrow states that frames are not ideas, but ways of packaging and 
presenting these ideas.41 Issue framing is presenting an issue in a way that is understandable to 
the target audience.42 Typically, NGOs frame issues by matching the empirical or statistical data 
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of the debate with firsthand accounts that help to personalize the numbers.43 Cuing is based on 
the idea that the presentation of new information often causes actors to look at an issue in a new 
way.  
Another form of soft power that NGOs utilize is acculturation, defined as “actors 
adopting the beliefs and behavioral patterns of surrounding cultures”.44 Acculturation relies on 
the social-psychological costs of not conforming to group norms and the “cognitive dissonance” 
or discomfort of following divergent views. For costs to be enforced, there has to be a “naming 
and shaming” of countries who are violating the socially acceptable norms. NGOs fulfill this 
function by publishing reports that highlight violating states.45 The difference between 
persuasion and acculturation is that acculturation only requires that an actor perceive that a social 
norm is important to a target group. Furthermore, persuasion requires the assessment of the 
merits of that social norm, whereas acculturation only involves an evaluation of one’s 
relationship in a social sphere.  
The third and final group argues that the primary responsibility of NGOs is to serve as a 
source of expertise to delegates through the provision of information.46 Being smaller bodies, 
NGOs are extremely mobile and thus can travel on-site, something that states and IGOs are often 
incapable of due to size and political constraints. During negotiations, delegates often find it 
difficult to keep track of the huge flow of information. By distributing flyers, reports, and hosting 
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seminars, NGOs that specialize in one area can provide detailed records to delegates who do not 
have the time to be experts in all subjects.47 NGOs target their own contributors, the public and 
decision makers. The goal of providing this information depends on the motivation of the NGO. 
If an NGO is allied with another state, this information can streamline negotiations, providing the 
partner state with the necessary tools to lobby its fellow state delegations. Even if an NGO is not 
partnered with a state, they often distribute information with the hope that if delegations are 
provided with the facts of an issue, they will be motivated to act. 
Given this framework on how NGOs influence states, I now turn to a discussion of the 
evolution of IR (and international law) into its modern day equivalent. This will provide the 
necessary background information to understand how states and NGOs interact on an 
international level. I will concentrate mainly the United Nations (UN), since this is where the 
greatest amount of interactions occurs. I will begin from a historical perspective, and then turn to 
an actual analysis of the interworking of the different bodies within the UN.48 This discussion, 
and a majority of the remainder of this paper, will focus on the issue of sovereignty, considered 
to be one of the most important issues of contention in IR. 
Most historians classify the history of IR into three separate categories: pre-World War I, 
post World War I/pre-world War II, and post World War II. In his textbook Swords into 
Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organization Inis Claude Jr. describes 
three major strands of thought concerning IR that occurred well before WWI. The first is that 
states began to recognize the benefits of multilateral diplomacy over the traditional bilateral 
agreement. The second strand involved the formation of public international unions that were 
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established to combat problems emerging out of the industrial revolution. The third strand was 
the Hague System, where Czar Nicholas II of Russia hosted two conferences to discuss strategies 
to prevent war and the conditions under which arbitration against another state was justified.  
The precursors of NGOs also began to emerge during this time. Well before the 
establishment of any official NGO, Simon E. Baldwin compiled a 12 page list of “international 
congresses” that occurred between 1826 and 1907. The importance of these congresses was that 
they allowed the participation of private members or associations not directly affiliated with 
states.49 The earliest examples of NGOs with an international scope were the World Alliance of 
YMCAs, founded in 1855 with member associations spread throughout Europe.50 In 1910 a 
group of 132 organizations came together to form the Union of International Associations.51 This 
was one of the first recorded instances where non-state organizations collaborated to form a 
larger network.  
However, IR first began to become more visible with the establishment of larger IGOs. 
At the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles established the League of Nations, the pre-
cursor to the UN. The two main principles of the League were: (1) member states agreed to 
respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of states, and (2) 
aggression by one state should elicit a response by all members with economic sanctions if 
necessary.52 When the League of Nations was first founded, NGOs were given the same rights as 
state delegations, except for the right to vote.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Charnovitz, S. "Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law."  
50 Willetts, Peter. 1996. “Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations.” Pp.31-62 
in Peter Willetts (ed.), The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the UN System.  
51 Willets , Peter. 1996. The Consience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental  
Organizations in the UN 
52 Forsythe, David. Human Rights in International Relations. 2006.  
	   26	  
In the 1920's and 30's, heightened tensions led to an increased role for private actors to 
communicate between states. Peter Willets estimates that between 1920 and 1933, the number of 
NGOs rose from 400 to 700.53 More importantly, during this time individual NGOs collaborated 
to form larger networks. In 1910 a group of 132 organizations came together to form the Union 
of International Associations.54 At a follow-up conference in 1929 in Geneva, a group of 
organizations that previously attended League of Nations meetings under the Leagues Secretariat 
agreed to form the Federation of Private and Semi-Official International Organizations.55 By 
1938 the Federation had grouped together 42 NGOs into its’ association. 
Prior to 1945, the relationship between a state and its citizens was allegedly absolute, 
with the state having supreme authority within its own borders. This is known as sovereignty, a 
concept that will be discussed in much greater detail in the next chapter, but is defined as each 
state is free to determine its own form of government and pursue its own interests without 
outside influence.56 However, following the end of WWII there was a movement towards the 
creation of international institutions where states consented to give up some of their sovereign 
authority. A new concept emerged, known as “pooled sovereignty” where states recognized that 
the protection of international security and human rights might justify slight restrictions in 
international authority.57 
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The most significant event following the end of WWII was the creation of the UN. 
During the San Francisco Conference, where initial drafts of the UN Charter were discussed, 
delegates were urged to look past their national interests in favor of what was best for the 
international community. During the drafting of the Charter, it quickly became apparent that the 
issue of national sovereignty was to be in constant conflict with the goals of creating a powerful 
IGO. According to the charter, the UN’s primary goal is maintaining peace and security. 
Towards that objective, “all member states shall refrain from threatening or using force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and from acting in any manner 
inconsistent with UN purposes; and…they shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means.”58 This peaceful coexistence among states is often difficult to achieve, requiring 
intervention in the domestic affairs of individual member states. 
There are two schools of thought on the relation of individual states to international law, 
given sovereignty constraints. The first group59 claims that the society of states that emerged at 
the end of the eighteenth century “fortified the older conception of the primacy of ‘mankind’ 
expressed through the law nations.”60 In other words, they believed that international law was 
merely a representation of a larger “common” law that was “backed up by religious and 
philosophical principles of good faith and good will between men and nations.”61 Therefore, 
national sovereignty is granted to states by the moral principles of natural law found in 
international society. The second group believed that international law was merely based on the 
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domestic experiences of states.62 Thus, international law is the creation of states and any restraint 
is dependent on their consent.  
The UN contributes to international law by assisting in the treaty drafting process. The 
definition of a treaty can be found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It 
defines an international agreement as one “concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law.” In international law “treaties”, “pacts”, “protocols”, 
“conventions”, “covenants” and “declarations” are all terms for international agreements, but 
they may differ in their formality.63 Treaties can either be between two nations (bilateral) or 
between three or more countries (multilateral). They are not binding or legally enforceable 
against states that are not signatories.  
The treaty process begins in negotiations, when diplomats are given instructions and 
authority by the state they represent to draft an agreement. Most negotiations occur in specific 
UN bodies. The UN is made up of three primary bodies: the Security Council, the General 
Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Many treaties get their start in the 
General Assembly64; however, in most instances the Assembly will merely refer drafting of a 
treaty to one of its subsidiary bodies such as ECOSOC. Most of ECOSOC’s work is done in ten 
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functional commissions, a majority of which deal with human rights and development.65 
Originally, it was little more than a carrier of messages between the General Assembly and other 
subsidiary bodies. However, Resolution 1235 allowed for ECOSOC to take up specific claims, 
while Resolution 1503 allowed the commission to deal with private petitions of gross violations 
of human rights.66 Article 62 of the UN Charter states that ECOSOC “may make 
recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all.” The Charter also states that ECOSOC may initiate studies, 
prepare draft conventions, and hold international conferences on matters that are within its 
competence. However, an action taken by ECOSOC requires the approval of the General 
Assembly.  
If the subject of a drafting negotiation pertain to human rights ECOSOC, will often 
forward this task to the Human Rights Council. Originally, the Human Rights Council was the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and was a subsidiary body to ECOSOC. At first the CHR 
only clarified law and did not criticize individual countries for violations. In the late 60’s the 
Commission gained the power to discuss human rights violations through resolutions 1235 and 
1503.67 From this point the Commission was responsible for disseminating information and 
“naming and shaming” countries into compliance. The Commission was deemed to be a 
relatively ineffective body and was redesigned into the Human Rights Council. However, the 
Council is still criticized for being an overly political body. 
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State delegations, following their instructions, debate with their peer states over the 
principles to be included in the treaty, the language of specific articles; and ultimately the final 
draft of the treaty itself. The final draft of the treaty is presented before the General Assembly for 
signature by member states. An authorized official, normally a UN diplomat, is responsible for 
signing the treaty on behalf of their member state. Signing a treaty does not make it legally 
binding, but instead merely signals intent to ratify. Ratification is “the act by which a state makes 
clear its intent to be legally bound by a treaty.”68 When a country ratifies a treaty (if permitted) it 
can issue a reservation, which is an opt-out clause for a specific provision of a treaty.69 Once 
ratified, a treaty may then be used in a domestic court in a monist country such as the 
Netherlands, where a treaty has the same status as domestic law. In dualist countries, such as the 
US, a treaty does not take effect until domestic legislation is implemented.  
From my research it became apparent that existing IR theory could not capture the 
nuances of the work that NGOs do in the international community. This forced me to go out of 
the normal realm of IR, from which I developed three different theories of how NGOs influence 
states in international negotiations. These three theories will provide the framework to analyze 
the work of NGOs in my specific case studies. The UN, especially ECOSOC, provided the 
necessary body for NGOs to effectively target state delegations. The next chapter is a discussion 
on the issue area in IR that this paper will focus on. 
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Chapter 2: The Rise of Collective and Human Security 
This paper will focus on one specific issue of relevance to the UN: human rights. Human 
rights are basic entitlements granted to individuals simply by being human. There are two 
different types of human rights: positive and negative. Positive human rights allow individuals to 
reach their full potential70; in other words, governments have to provide certain resources to its 
citizens. Positive rights are often associated with economic rights, such as the provision of 
healthcare. Negative rights are the absence of barriers, things that a government cannot do to its 
citizens.71 Negative rights are often associated with political freedoms such as the freedom of 
speech or religion. I chose to focus on this topic because international enforcement of human 
rights is one of the most prominent topics in discussions of violations of state sovereignty. 
Further a majority of the work done by NGOs occurs in field of human rights. This chapter will 
examine how the rise of human rights in international law and the UN led to an increasing role 
for NGOs in negotiations, relative to constraints placed by concerns over sovereignty. 
Human rights have been an issue in international relations well before the founding of the 
UN. For example, during the French Revolution the French people rallied around the Declaration 
of the Rights of a Citizen, which demanded basic freedoms. The revolution resulted in a French 
Constitution that protected both civil and political rights.72 During the 1800’s the most 
significant event in the US was the abolition of slavery. This was one of the first times that 
groups of people got together to advocate for a single human rights issue on an international 
level. Two other important movements during this time period were humanitarian law and 
women’s rights. Henri Dunant founded the Red Cross to provide aid and to lobby states to 
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outlaw certain war crimes after witnessing the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino. The result of 
this movement was the Geneva Conventions, which placed in writing the various laws of war 
that states still follow. Women’s rights introduced a new issue to international relations because 
the protection of these rights was not about relationships between states, but how a state treated 
its own citizens. Where cutting of the slave trade was a major step in combating slavery, 
women’s rights enters into the realm of culturally specific rights.  
This issue of respecting national sovereignty versus the protection of human rights really 
emerged as a visible problem in IR in the UN Charter.73 At the early Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference to draft the charter, discussion of human rights was limited. However, at the San 
Francisco Conference, the U.S. led a coalition that pushed not only for the inclusion of general 
human rights provisions, but that member states have an obligation to protect these rights.74 
Representatives of 1,200 voluntary organizations were present during proceedings, with the US 
inviting over 42 NGOs to participate in the conference. William Korey credits the inclusion of 
human rights provisions in the UN charter to lobbying by non-state actors, in particular the 
American Jewish Committee.75 These non-state actors worked closely with then US Secretary of 
State Edward Stettinius on behalf of President Roosevelt.76  
While Theodore Roosevelt spoke of the four freedoms77, he was reluctant to create an 
international organization with a strong enforcement mechanism that could interfere in the affairs 
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of the US. The resulting UN Charter represents a compromise between these two conflicting 
ideologies. Chapter 1 of the charter states that the UN will not interfere “within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the state.” Later in Chapter 9 the charter seems to contradict itself by spelling out 
human rights provisions that the UN was founded to protect. Article 56 states that “all members 
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the 
achievement of the human rights purpose”, but the UN itself was not granted the supranational 
authority to enforce these rights.  
Given these concerns about sovereignty, it is not surprising that the charter is very 
specific in defining the criteria that NGOs need to possess to be recognized by the international 
community. The requirements for an actor to qualify as NGO, as defined by ECOSOC, are to be 
“founded by private individuals; be independent of states; be oriented toward rule of law; pursue 
public rather than private interests as an objective; demonstrate a transnational scope of 
activities, and possess a minimal organizational structure.”78 Willetts adds the negative criteria 
that NGOs “cannot advocate the use of violence; cannot be a school, a university or a political 
party; general rather than restricted to a particular communal group, nationality or country.”79 
Profit-oriented organizations can still qualify as NGOs as long as maximizing profit is 
not their sole purpose. On the other hand, Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss define certain 
actors that may appear to be NGOs on the surface, but do not qualify under the definition set by 
the UN.80 Government Organized NGOs (GONGOs) are formed by states to achieve certain 
objectives in the public sector that protect their national interests. Donor-organized NGOs 
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(DONGOs) are formed to protect donor interests in the public sectors. Quasi-nongovernmental 
organizations (QUANGOS), such as the International Conference of the Red Cross, receive part 
of their funding from states. QUANGOs are often still invited to participate in UN proceedings, 
but GONGOs and DONGOs are almost always denied access.   
Given concerns over sovereignty, it is surprising that the UN Charter offered NGOs 
official access to the proceedings of the UN, an access point through which they could channel 
efforts to influence states. Article 71 in the UN Charter allows ECOSOC to consult with NGOs 
on “matters within its competence” as long as they meet certain qualifications.81 Before 
ECOSOC even held its first meeting, it had received four applications from the World Federation 
of Trade Unions, the American Federation of Labor, the International Co-operative Alliance, and 
the International Federation of Women, all requesting the ability to participate in the 
discussion.82 Therefore, the General Assembly recommended that ECOSOC develop an 
agreement to cooperate with these organizations. ECOSOC then set up a committee on NGOs to 
work out a set of guidelines.83  
The main purpose of the Committee on NGOs is to determine which NGOs are granted 
consultative status to UN proceedings. To gain consultative status, NGOs must first issue a letter 
of intent and fill out the application package to the UN. The candidate then attends an initial 
NGO section screening, followed by closed deliberation by the committee on NGOs.84 ECOSOC 
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states to vet NGOs before granting them access to negotiations, leading to the complaint that 
gaining consultative status has become a political game between countries.  
Not only do NGOs need to be concerned with meeting the general criteria for 
consultative status, the process is made even more complicated since ECOSOC devised three 
separate levels of consultative status for NGOs: general consultative status, special consultative 
status and roster status.85 The differences revolve around the size of the general population that 
the NGO reaches, with each rung up the ladder offering more exclusive privileges. The three 
levels of classification determine the actual involvement that NGOs can have in UN proceedings. 
Only NGOs with general consultative status can propose items for the ECOSOC agenda.86 
Further, NGOs that possess general status can attend ECOSOC meetings and speak or circulate 
statements up to 2,000 words. NGOs with special status have the same rights, except they cannot 
speak at ECOSOC meetings or propose agenda items and their statements are limited to 1,500 
words. NGOs designated as roster organizations can only participate when their presence is 
requested by member states.  
Despite these restrictions, all NGOs that have been granted any level of consultative 
status can freely lobby ambassadors within the halls of the UN. Originally they were even 
granted access to the delegates’ lounge, a location where important informal debate occurs. But 
due to a recent string of NGO violations of UN law, this privilege has been removed.87 Tables 
are placed in UN hallways near the meeting rooms so that NGOs can display their information. 
NGOs are also allowed to host lectures and seminars for delegates in an informal setting outside 
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official UN chambers. Finally, NGOs can be granted association with the UN Department of 
Public Information (DPI), which provides access to meetings and deliberations but does not 
allow NGO participation aside from observation. 
Following the adoption UN Charter, the first important human rights document is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (’48). It covers thirty principles, ranging from rights of 
political and civic political participation to economic rights.88 Being a declaration, this treaty is 
nonbinding upon signatories. Instead it serves as a representation of what states hope to achieve, 
and their signature is more of a symbolic gesture.  
After the Declaration came the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), both 
in 1966. The ICCPR created a Human Rights Committee that processes individual complaints. It 
includes two optional protocols: (1) hearing individual complaints, and (2) the abolition of the 
death penalty.89 Together, the Universal Declaration, ICCPR and the ICESR make up the 
“International Bill of Human Rights”.  
Many scholars conclude that the Cold War represented a step backwards in progress 
towards the protection of human rights. During the Cold War, concerns over sovereignty were so 
large that the respect for human rights, and the promotion of certain rights in other countries, 
took a distant third behind security and economic concerns. The movement known as 
McCarthyism made discussion of international human rights almost impossible.  Little progress 
was made in the UN since the US and Soviet Union's veto power in the Security Council enabled 
them to table almost all proceedings.90 This is why it took nearly two decades for the ICCPR and 
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ICESR to emerge after the Declaration.91 The Soviet bloc and other developing countries pushed 
for economic social rights, whereas Western states supported civil and political rights.92 The 
Western bloc eventually accepted economic rights as long as they could be gradually realized 
over time, which resulted in the formation of two covenants so that different supervisory 
mechanisms could be created.  
Given the combination of Cold War paranoia and the significant increase in the number 
of NGOs, it was not surprising that states began to reevaluate the positions of NGOs in the UN. 
Resolution 1225 called for a review of the work on done by the Committee on NGOs and the 
existing admission criteria for consultative status.93  More importantly, Resolution 1225 allowed 
the Committee on NGOs to review consultative status every four years. NGOs are also required 
to prepare and submit reports on their activities at specified intervals. If the Committee finds an 
NGO in violation of financing practices or falling under the influence of a state, Resolution 
1225, under “Suspension and Withdrawal of Consultative Status”, gave the Committee the 
ability to nullify its consultative status. This led to multiple reviews in the UN where many 
NGOs lost their consultative status.94  
The review of the work on the Committee of NGOs ended up focusing on its 
membership. Originally the Committee was dominated by what became known as the “Big 
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United States and the United Kingdom). Somewhat surprisingly, during the review ordered by 
Resolution 1225 the “Big Five” ceded some of their power when the Committee was enlarged 
from 7 to 13 members.  In 1966, membership was once again increased from 13 to 19, and a 
formal requirement that the seats be distributed on a regional basis was passed. Thereafter, there 
was large increase in the number of African countries on the Committee causing a shift from the 
previous Western dominance.95  
Prior to this review, for the Committee on NGOs to grant consultative status, a NGO 
must meet certain criteria: “international standing, independent governance, and geographical 
affiliation.”96 However, before this review it became apparent that NGOs represented a much 
more diverse issue base.  As a result, it was difficult for the Committee to compare the relative 
merits of various NGOs given such vague criteria.97 In response, ECOSOC drafted Resolution 
1296 that lists more specific criteria for an NGO to gain access: (1) activities relevant to the 
work of ECOSOC and aligned with the UN’s goals and principles, (2) in existence for at least 
two years, (3) an established headquarters and an executive officer, (4) democratic and 
transparent decision-making processes, and (5) financial and political independence from 
governments.98 Additionally, it limited the reasons that an NGO could lose its consultative status 
to three circumstances: (1) “substantial evidence of secret governmental financial influence to 
induce an organization to undertake acts contrary to the principles of the UN”, (2) 
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“systematically engaging in unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against member states,” 
and (3) “if, within the preceding three years, an organization had not made any positive or 
effective contribution to the work of the Council or its commissions and other  subsidiary 
organs”.99  
Finally, this review limited the reach of NGOs in UN proceedings by limiting what they 
could release in written statements. Originally, written statements could be submitted to the 
Secretariat, who would then translate them into the official UN languages and distribute the 
document throughout ECOSOC. However, again sovereignty concerns caused many states to be 
concerned about statements that refer to human rights situations in specific states (Willets 2010). 
As a result, Resolution 728F forbid communications from NGOs that referred to violations in 
specific countries from being circulated in official debate in ECOSOC or its subsidiaries.100  
Despite the rise of US hegemony, the end of the Cold War signified an emergence of 
increased collaboration among states, a trend coined “collective” security by many scholars.  
The basic definition of collective security is that states join together to prevent any of their 
members from “using coercion to gain advantage, especially conquering another.” Collective 
security assumes that any member state may at some time behave in a manner requiring 
corrective action, thus violating state sovereignty. Hence, the goal of collective security is to 
serve as a deterrent against abusive behavior-- threats against peace would lead to the 
mobilization of a force so large that no state would want to deal with the consequences.101 
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Collective security develops a new international norm that international order may occasionally 
trump individual state sovereignty. 
Besides the increased collaboration among states, the end of the Cold War also marked 
the beginning a phase of globalization that further increased the interdependence among states. 
Jessica Matthews, in her article “Power Shift”, describes how the traditional Westphalian 
system102 has been replaced by a new concept known as “human security”.103 She expands upon 
the definition of collective security, stating that security is no longer just about physical safety 
and military power, but depends upon the provision of resources necessary for survival in daily 
life. The near concurrent emergence of collective and human security linked the maintenance of 
international order with the protection of the dignity of individuals for the first time.  
Admittedly, scholars are torn on the extent state sovereignty can be violated in the name 
of both collective and human security. Some argue that the concept of positivism, or that states 
are subject to no moral authority above them, has taken a backseat to a new moral age where 
crude and abusive behavior is no longer acceptable.104 Along these lines, there has been a new 
emphasis placed on emphasizing the “morality” behind human rights during negotiations. The 
idea is that moral arguments are effective because they influence two important levels of 
decision making during negotiations: (1) policy debate and (2) the directed consciousness of 
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individuals to aid their decision-making.105 Moral arguments therefore attempt to restrain power 
(in this case state sovereignty) in order to direct it towards certain goals.106   
On the other hand, realists, such as Professor Falk of Princeton University, conclude that 
concerning the power of morality in international law, “is mainly a kind of moralistic charade” 
that is not taken seriously by military strategists during times of war.107 Many scholars, similar to 
Falk, conclude that drafting treaties focused on ethics leads to leads to weak resolutions lacking 
concrete enforcement mechanisms 
Events in the 1990s demonstrate that the existing UN structures were not successful in 
protecting individuals from systematic violations of human rights, proving that moral arguments 
can indeed lead to progress in negotiations. The newly established connection between collective 
and human security showed how sometimes sovereignty is a two way street. States have a 
responsibility to protect their citizens, and if they fail to do this they can no longer be considered 
sovereign entities. Out of this discussion emerged a doctrine called the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P).108 The R2P frames the discussion of intervention as a moral responsibility and not a right 
to intervene when a government fails to protect its citizens. Typically, intervention begins with 
less direct measures such as economic or political pressure, but if this does not work stronger 
action such as military intervention may be necessary. Since R2P is deeply controversial, certain 
well-defined criteria must be met for it to be invoked. The first principle is “just cause”, or that 
inaction would lead to large-scale loss of life. Next there are precautionary principles such as 
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“right intention” with the goal to stop human suffering, “last resort” where all other measures 
have been ineffective, “proportional means” where the scale, duration, and intensity be the 
minimum necessary to rectify the situation, and “reasonable prospects” that intervention will be 
successful.109 The final principle is “right authority”, or that intervention is deemed most 
legitimate when an international body such as the United Nations orders it. 
The R2P document marked a watershed moment for NGOs in that it showed that there 
were situations where national sovereignty should be violated to protect individuals, opening the 
door for NGOs to have access to situations on the ground. Returning to Matthews’ article “Power 
Shift”, she describes how the reevaluation of security begun to shift the balance of power in IR 
from the traditional state-centered approach to a recognition by states that the protection of 
individuals may require them to give up some of their responsibilities to other societal actors.  
Miguel de Laringa and Claire Tureren Sjolander label this new tend towards openness in 
IR following the Cold War as “New Multilateralism”.110 They assert that the state is still the 
foundation for “new” multilateralism, but the key difference from the original definition is that 
states now have to evaluate their policies relative to transnational public opinion.111 As the 
former Secretary General to the United Nations Boutros- Boutros Ghali in his “Agenda for 
Peace” states, “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed.” Oscar Schacther, who 
is slightly more skeptical then Ghali, asserts that the nature of state sovereignty has changed 
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following the Cold War, but that the “reality of state power and authority cannot be ignored.”112 
Both sides agree, however, that following the end of the Cold War new actors such as NGOs 
became more involved in the affairs normally associated solely with the state.  
This trend towards increased involvement for NGOs can be seen during the 1993-96 
review of the UN Charter where there was an increasing movement for ECOSOC to recommend 
that consultative status relationship between NGOs and ECOSOC should extend to the larger 
General Assembly. In January 1997, the Open-Ended Working Group covering UN reform set 
up a subgroup on NGO participation (with Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan in the chair) to discuss this 
issue.113 While the roles of NGOs was slightly expanded, it was clear that states are still reluctant 
to give up sovereignty since the subgroup came up with only three proposals: (1) NGOs should 
have better access to documents in the assembly, (2) more funds should be allocated to widen 
electronic access to documents and (3) a new trust fund was created to assist NGOs from 
developing countries and former communist countries.114 
In 1948 the UN listed 41 groups who were granted consultative status in ECOSOC. By 
1993 this number had skyrocketed to 1,500.115 Nonetheless, many NGOs are still critical of the 
process to gain consultative status. Their first complaint is that NGOs may petition for years if a 
few states cooperate to continue to block their access. The Committee does not even have to 
deny an NGO access, but instead can delay proceedings by asking more questions during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Schachter, Oscar. “Soveriegnty and Threats to Peace” in Weiss, Thomas G and Leon 
Gordenker. 1996. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. 	  113	  Willetts, Peter. 1996. “Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations.” Pp.31-62 
in Peter Willetts (ed.), The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the UN System	  114	  Willetts, Peter. 1996. “Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations.” Pp.31-62 
in Peter Willetts (ed.), The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the UN System	  115	  Simmons, P. J. "Learning to Live with NGOs." 	  
	   44	  
debate to grant consultative states. By doing this a state can ensure that the NGO can get lost in 
proceedings for years. A second major complaint is the states that are often the target of human 
rights NGOs are often included as members on the Committee.  The third complaint is that the 
large increase in the number of applications has caused the Committee to become overburdened 
and not give proper consideration to each application.116 
In short, the end of the Cold War marked the emergence of three new concepts in IR: (1) 
state sovereignty could be violated on the basis of the protection of collective security, (2) 
security is no longer viewed merely in terms of military protection, and (3) recognition by states 
that the protection of individuals may require them to give up some of their responsibilities to 
other societal actors. During the Cold War human rights were still important, but they took a 
distant third to security and economic concerns. Towards the end of the Cold War, UN Secretary 
General Javier Perez de Cueller states he saw “an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the 
belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and 
legal documents.”117 The current trend of international law is more neutral; state sovereignty is 
still respected; however, there is now the recognition that the violation of certain fundamental 
human rights may justify intervention in state affairs. In the remaining chapters this paper will 
attempt to show how the emergence of the idea that sovereignty is a two way street served both 
as a gateway for NGOs to negotiations in the UN and provided them with the necessary 
legitimacy to influence state behavior.  
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Chapter 3: The Power of Information 
Of all the IR frameworks discussed in Chapter 1, realism offers the most limited 
understanding of international human rights. While realism is most likely correct in its 
assumption that when security concerns are high, human rights are hardly a priority, it neglects 
to acknowledge that power in IR is no longer solely attached to military and economic resources. 
Beginning in the middle of the Cold War, a new idea emerged that states may be subject to a 
moral authority above them and that crude and abusive behavior may no longer be acceptable. 
The end of the Cold War led to an emergence of collective security that in some cases may trump 
individual state sovereignty. As a result of the rise of collective security, new non-state actors 
rose to the defense of individuals under the guide of human security. Here I will introduce two 
case studies, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the Ottawa Convention Banning 
Landmines (Landmine Convention), that both fall under the category of human security because 
they deny the individual provisions necessary for life. 
To begin, I will provide the necessary background to understand these two case studies 
by examining how these two issues emerged and gained support in the international community. 
The issue of torture118 predates concerns about Landmines119. Until the eighteenth century torture 
had been both regularly practiced and legal in Western civilizations for over seven centuries. In 
the 20th century torture gained increased international attention due to the rise of Nazi Germany. 
Following the war, the international community decided to take steps to ensure that the atrocities 
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that occurred during WWII never happened again. This led to the drafting of the Geneva 
Conventions that redefined the rules of humanitarian law concerning prisoners of war. The 
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions forbids “cruel treatment and torture of 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities.” The third Geneva Convention is slightly more 
specific where under article 99 it states “no moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a 
prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.”   
Following the Geneva Convention, torture took a backseat in UN proceedings until an 
increase in violence associated with military coups in Latin America.120 These changes in power 
were often justified as a response to a corrupt government or a civilian “uprising” typically 
associated with guerilla warfare. Arguably the most visible case was the military coup against 
Salvador Allende (constitutional government of Chile) by Augusto Pinochet and his armed 
forces on September 11, 1973.121 Pinochet’s rise to power led to a consistent era of brutality in 
Chile that the General Assembly simply could no longer ignore. In February 1975 the CHR 
formed an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation in Chile to examine the problem.122 Once 
there, it found numerous inconsistencies between victim’s accounts and what the government 
had been telling the UN. The violations were so atrocious that the international community felt a 
moral obligation to act.  
Switching focus to my second case study, landmines have been a widely used tool in the 
military since the 1940s. According to the UN, each year 2-5 million new mines are scattered in 
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the ground throughout the world.123 The State Department estimates that 85 to 90 million 
landmines are currently active in the grounds over 62 countries.124 The countries that most suffer 
from the problem of landmines are in the developing world, especially in Africa and Asia, and 
thus do not possess sufficient resources to deal with the problem.125  
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 also address the effects of weapons such as AP mines 
in its provision on the “Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”, but advances in 
technology led to additional protocols since the existing ones were considered outdated. These 
changes led to two fundamental principles of international humanitarian law: broadly, the 
weapons used by states engaged in conflict may be limited and (2) specifically, weapons that 
causes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering were prohibited. (Geneva Convention 
Protocol I). However, the Geneva Conventions do recognize “military necessity” that permits 
violence deemed necessary and reasonable as long as the means do not violate international law.  
Henry Dunant, the father of the Red Cross, first drew attention to the dangers of 
landmines in 1862 in his work A Memory of Solferino .126 Nonetheless, it was not until the 1970s 
that the ICRC had established landmines as a conventional weapon of concern that needed to be 
addressed by the international community. In 1973 it published a report based on discussions by 
governmental and NGO experts entitled Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or 
Have Indiscriminate Effects. Following the release of this report, the ICRC convened a 	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conference of governmental experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in Lucerne, 
Switzerland. 
It was not until landmine use reached a period of crisis in the early 1990s that the issue 
was finally taken up by the UN. Huge causalities during refugee-repatriation efforts in 
Afghanistan and Cambodia in the early 1990s especially drew attention the issue.127 Events in 
these two countries made it apparent that there was a lack of mine awareness among personnel in 
the UN Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).128 This crisis was caused by a large increase in the 
number of nations, especially in the developing world, producing and exporting mines. 
Furthermore, it was exacerbated by the fact that the nature of war had changed, since now many 
wars were long-lasting and involved cash-starved entities for which cheap landmines offer a 
great solution.129 On the other hand, for those who can afford it, landmine production had 
become much more sophisticated. Momentum for a ban reached its full potential when Prince 
Sihanouk of Cambodia called for a complete ban of AP mines.130  
Relative to the issue of torture, the main NGO actor was Amnesty International (AI). 
After reading an article where two Portuguese prisoners were sentenced to life imprisonment for 
treason and being appalled by conditions they faced, Peter Beneson came up with the vision of a 
one-year worldwide campaign to draw the international community’s attention to detained 
prisoners.131 With the support of the prominent English Quaker, Eric Baker, and the highly 
respected international lawyer Louis Blom-Cooper, he published a piece in The Observer entitled 
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“The Forgotten Prisoner”.132 In this article Beneson and his supporters officially called for a one-
year campaign titled “An Appeal for Amnesty”. Increased international interest in Beneson’s 
campaign led to the establishment of various regional offices. The first two began in the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and then spread to the rest of Western Europe 
and North America.133 The network that formed from these small branches would eventually lead 
to the establishment of AI. As Beneson asserts, “AI from its earliest days has been a grass roots 
movement, united into common actions.”134  
AI finally established a headquarters staffed by an international secretariat in London in 
1963.135 In this headquarters a bureau was created to research political imprisonment in different 
countries, and then to prepare background papers to distribute to different actors. AI refocused its 
efforts in 1972 through its worldwide Campaign for the Abolition of Torture. Through this 
campaign, AI hoped to generate an international movement against torture based on the 
prohibition of torture contained in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
ultimate goal of this campaign was a UN resolution that would call for a Convention Against 
Torture. AI had done extensive marketing research to establish itself in the international 
community as a recognizable brand. The emblem of AI, a candle encircled by barbed wire, and 
AI’s slogan “better to light a candle than curse the darkness”, are recognized worldwide. By the 
end of 1977, it had well over 150,000 members in over 100 countries.136 
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AI is not the only NGO working towards eliminating the process of torture. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) works diligently to alleviate some of the worst 
conditions for political prisoners. They are one of the only organizations granted the ability to 
make actual in-person visits with detainees to observe prison conditions.137 Between 1971 and 
1981, ICRC officials made approximately 15,000 visits to almost 80 countries.138 Unlike AI, 
however, ICRC does not generally publish the findings of its missions. Further, the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) combats torture by focusing on the legal aspect. It lobbies 
international delegations in attempt to ensure that there is greater observance of human rights 
norms.139 Similar to AI, it publishes quarterly reviews, specific country reports, and other studies 
that provide facts on the prevalence of torture in the world.  
Turning to the main actors in the Landmines convention, in 1991 Bobby Muller, the head 
of Washington D.C. based Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), met with Thomas 
Gebauer, the director of Medico International (MI) over lunch to discuss how the placement of 
AP mines was interfering with their humanitarian work. The two men agreed to use their 
organizations to launch a global campaign calling for a total ban on all landmines.140  The 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was formally launched after a meeting in the 
offices of Human Rights Watch (HRW) in New York in October 1992.141 More than 50 
representatives from more than 40 NGOs met in London at the first ICBL International 	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Conference on Landmines to discuss how to expand the movement from fragmented regional 
efforts to a transnational network.142  
The steering committee was made up of Handicap International (HI) (France), HRW 
(US), MI (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (UK), Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) 
(US) and the VVAF (US). Each NGO brought its own set of expertise to the table. For example, 
PHR provides medical documentations on human rights violations, supports medical personnel 
who are facing difficulties while defending human rights and assists in developing a human 
rights curriculum for the medical profession.143 HRW conducts regular investigations of human 
rights abuses in over sixty countries around the world. A smaller division of HRW is the Arms 
Project, which seeks to eliminate arms transfers by governments associated with consistent 
violations of human rights.144 Jody Williams from the VVAF was hired to serve as coordinator of 
the ICBL.  
The steering committee was responsible for providing direction for the global campaign 
and to serve as the umbrella organization connecting regional campaigns that were focused upon 
grassroots efforts. The ICBL had three central objectives: (1) an international ban on the use, 
production, stockpiling, sale, transfer or export of AP mines; (2) the creation of an international 
fund to assist victims of mines, assist in landmines awareness programs, and finance mine 
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removal programs that would be administered by the UN and (3) enforcing that producers and 
exporters of AP mines contribute to this fund.145  
Based on this background, I would concur that the boomerang model developed by Keck 
and Sikkink can best describe the importance of these networks. If abusive behavior occurs in 
one state, it is very difficult for the status quo to change unless outside actors become involved. 
Networks under the leadership of either one actor or a steering committee can help to group a 
bunch of regional coalitions into one strong cohesive group that can pressure abusive states. This 
cohesive structure becomes especially important once negotiations have begun, which will be 
discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter.  
Further, it appears Darren Hawkins is correct in his assertion that NGOs can have the 
greatest effect on pre-established norms. The establishment of transnational NGO networks in 
both cases began well before the point of crisis, but efforts were significantly intensified 
following the situation in Chile in the CAT and large civilian casualties in Landmines. The 
beginnings of a norm that proclaimed both practices unacceptable occurred because of attention 
drawn to domestic situations. More importantly, the UN in both cases did not acknowledge the 
situation until political situations led to escalation. As Theo van Voen, the former director of the 
UN Division of Human Rights describes, there was a “crise de conscience also prevalent in other 
human rights organizations and bodies such as the UN CHR.”146 Therefore, while the work of 
NGOs begins well before a crisis, political momentum is necessary for the issue to get on the 
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international agenda. Once on the international agenda, it is much easier for NGOs to gain access 
to additional resources, such as information and important political figures. 
While the work of NGOs often makes leaders of state nervous, the change in how states 
viewed the issue of sovereignty following the Cold War, combined with the political scene 
reaching a stage of crisis as described above, provides the necessary push many states need to 
reevaluate the work of NGOs. In many cases, states are willing to collaborate with NGOs, since 
they can perform necessary tasks that states are unable to do. NGOs provide services for which 
they possess a comparative advantage in terms of flexibility, efficiency, and proximity to target 
populations. For example, NGOs, being smaller bodies, can often travel on-site to dangerous 
locations that states may be reluctant to send their own observers. Further, since delegates cannot 
be experts in all fields, they often rely on the information that NGOs provide to fill in the gaps 
and streamline negotiations. After establishing initial networks, NGOs moved quickly to 
capitalize on this “deep seated conviction of urgency and widely felt sense of human compassion 
and solidarity” that had emerged in international relations.147 In both cases, NGOs began their 
campaigns by dispatching missions to countries to gather more detailed information. A majority 
of the work of NGOs occurs during this information-gathering phase, well before official 
negotiations even begin in the UN.  
It is important to understand that accurate information on human rights abuses is 
extremely difficult to obtain. Concerning torture, first-hand accounts are very difficult to come 
by since the act normally takes place without independent witnesses.148 Furthermore, torture 
techniques have progressed to the point where victims may not have obvious long-lasting 
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physical scars.149 Most victims and their families are too afraid of future repercussions to 
complain to outside organizations. Concerning Landmines, hospitals and clinics in war zones are 
often overburdened and thus pay little attention to collecting accurate health information.150  
When dispatching missions that attempt to monitor situations on the ground, most NGOs 
provide their representatives with specific instructions. For example, AI follows the rule that no 
mission is to be sent clandestinely to a country. Further, while in the country, AI officials are not 
supposed to release any statements to the country’s press. Once the mission is over, AI officials 
are required to submit their findings to the International Executive Committee. It is not until this 
body approves the mission’s findings that a memorandum is prepared presenting the findings 
along with recommendations.151 The purpose of all these steps is to ensure the accuracy of all the 
information collected to make sure states are willing to allow access to NGOs. Again, gathering 
information typically involves the violation of state sovereignty, and in most cases NGOs are 
observing states that have been accused of abusive behavior. Even abusive states may collaborate 
out of fear of the social and economic repercussions of refusing to admit a mission, which in 
practice appears as an admission of guilt. 
An example of a one of the more famous direct contact missions concerning the issue of 
torture occurred in October 1973 when the new regime in Chile agreed to admit a three-man 
team to examine allegations of abusive behavior by the government.152 Claims of torture against 
political detainees had begun, as discussed earlier in this chapter, once the military government 
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of General Pinochet seized power in 1973.153 During this mission AI concluded that Chilean law 
does little to protect its citizens and that Chilean courts are very liberal in their interpretation of 
what constitutes torture.  
An example of a smaller mission focused on the issue of torture would be AI’s mission to 
the Republic of Philippines. The team consisted of only two members, American lawyer Thomas 
C. Jones and a member of the International Secretariat, Wenhsien Huang.154  These two officials 
held discussions with many government officials, including President Ferdinand Marcos. An 
example of a famous case study was the mission to Afghanistan led by Rae McGrath (serving as 
a representative of MAG).  McGrath was known for having both military experience and 
expertise with landmines and other munitions.155 
According to the existing literature, the purpose of these transnational networks is to 
strengthen international norms. My research concurs, since in both case studies NGOs used this 
information collected from direct contact missions to accomplish three goals: (1) to raise 
awareness about the issue, (2) to initiate the standard setting process that will continue during 
negotiations and (3) to “name and shame” the states that violate these prescribed standards. The 
most common thing that NGOs do with the information they gather is to compile it into a single 
report that can then be published and distributed to the public. For example, the first major report 
compiled by AI that gained international attention was its 1973 Report on Torture. This report 
was 224 pages in length and examined allegations of torture occurring in sixty countries over a 
10-year period.156 In 1991 MAG released the Afghanistan Mines Survey, which was a 
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“comprehensive survey of the impact of landmines on people, their animals, their agricultural 
land, irrigation systems, farming implements and access routes” based on the information 
collected by McGrath.157 This was followed by PHR’s main work Landmines: A Deadly Legacy 
in 1993. It compiled the evidence that the organization had found from its missions to Cambodia, 
Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Iraqi Kurdistan.158  
The main question is what is the purpose of these reports; in other words, how do they 
accomplish the three conditions mentioned above? One way to answer this question is to look at 
how they are organized. As discussed in earlier chapters, scholars theorize that the success of a 
transnational network to create social change is dependent on its ability to frame the issue in a 
way that resonates with its intended audience. This leads to an important caveat: the political 
situations in the CAT and Landmines are extremely different, and thus NGOs utilized slightly 
different strategies when gathering information. Therefore, while the purpose of the published 
reports in the two case studies remains the same, the way the information is framed is slightly 
different due to the unique circumstances. 
The first part of a report typically contains a basic background section before delving into 
specifics. Normally the report will contain a basic definition of an issue and an examination 
section that looks at the problem from a larger perspective. For example, the report Torture in the 
Eighties159 opens with a section on the moral arguments against torture. It immediately attacks 
the utilitarian argument that the effective use of torture can be used to save lives since 
information is obtained that otherwise would not have been. AI argues that those who use torture 
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would naturally argue that they could not have obtained the information otherwise. States often 
become reliant on torture and other methods of interrogation are used less frequently.  
Reports on Landmines normally begin with an analysis of the military utility of AP 
mines. The main tactical argument in favor of AP landmines is that they allow a military to shape 
the battlefield by denying access to a given territory to enemy forces. This allows a military force 
to move their opponents to a vulnerable position.160 Further, AP mines are often used to defend 
states’ borders against enemy invasion.161 Patrick Blagden, in his work “The Use of Mines and 
Impact of Technology”, counters most of these points stating that the perceived utility of mines 
operates under the incorrect assumption that they are used lawfully.162 He concludes that AP 
minefields cause more damage to one’s own troops than the enemies; (1) they restrict soldiers 
from changing their position during conflict; and (2) the fear of landmines cause many patrols to 
fail in completing their mission. The ICRC also addressed this topic in its report, Friend or Foe? 
A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines, a survey of these 
weapons in conflicts over the past 55 years.163 It came to similar conclusions as Blagden, noting 
that the cost of using AP mines in terms of “causalities, limitation of tactical flexibility and loss 
of sympathy of the indigenous population is higher than has been generally acknowledged.164  
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This introduction section also contains examples of domestic and international law that 
pertains to the issue. When the AI mission examined existing Philippine law, they found that the 
1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines in section 3 states “the Philippines adopt the 
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land…”165 In 
Argentina, AI found fault with law 22.068, issued on September 12, 1979, that allowed the state 
or a relative to declare a person who disappeared during the previous five years dead. The date of 
the death was to be officially labeled on the date of disappearance.166  
Normally, this background section will include a section discussing the allegations 
against the country and thus the purpose of the mission. AI's mission to the Philippines had two 
main objectives: (1) “seek the support of members of the Philippines government for the 
development of regional institutions for the protection of human rights in Southeast Asia” and 
(2) “to discuss with members of the government and with concerned Filipinos, problems relating 
to imprisonment under martial law, the treatment of prisoners and the procedures for the release 
of prisoners.”167  
Finally, this section will conclude with an analysis of the victims and perpetrators of the 
offense. Concerning torture, these reports show, as a whole, that victims of torture are an 
extremely diverse group. However, they do share many characteristics that lead them to be 
targeted by states. Typically, a victim of torture is a political opponent of the government who is 
attempting to rally others towards some degree of social change. Many victims are assumed to be 
associated with armed insurgency groups in order to justify government action against them. 	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Concerning landmines, AP mines are described as being a “blind weapon” that cannot 
distinguish between a soldier and a civilian.168 Since landmines can remain dormant in the 
ground long after the fighting has ended, the majority of the victims end up being children.169 For 
those who survive, the initial explosion can drive dirt and bacteria into their skin, causing 
secondary infections. The shock wave resulting from the explosion can cause serious damage to 
blood vessels, forcing physicians to amputate higher up the leg then would normally be 
necessary.170  
Regarding torture, the perpetrator can be either police or military, but in most cases it is 
the military that seizes the victim. This individual may or may not be officially affiliated with the 
government; therefore, they may or may not be wearing a uniform or be in a marked car.  The 
report Torture in the Eighties includes a whole section describing the training that torturers go 
through in order to show that torture is an endemic process, something that cannot be simply 
solve by punishing a few individuals. It discusses how the process of ideological indoctrination 
often counts as torture itself, since training can consist of ordering the soldiers to eat their berets, 
swearing allegiance to commanding officers, and performing demeaning acts in front of their 
fellow soldiers. Relative to the perpetrators in landmines, the largest producers were China, Italy, 
and the former Soviet Union (Cameron). Italy is associated with playing the biggest role in 
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exporting, but almost every country has purchased landmines at some point, except San Marino, 
Andorra, and Saint Lucia.171 
This opening section serves the dual purpose of providing information and activating an 
emotional response from the reader. The information gathered about the use of torture and 
landmines allowed NGOs to draw conclusions on the relative utility of the two practices. It 
significantly strengthens NGO arguments to argue that these practices are ineffective before even 
tackling the moral aspect. Further, examining existing law (both domestic and international) 
gives NGOs increased legitimacy when they denounce a certain practice that is utilized in a state. 
By describing the common suffering among victims in this section, NGOs begin the process of 
evoking emotion from the reader. NGOs believed this emotional response can effectively 
capitalize on the moral movement previously described and, thus, pressure actors to action. 
These reports pinpoint the actor that NGOs should concentrate on when directing their efforts to 
influence a state away from any given action.  
The next major section in most reports provides a detailed account of how the 
information was gathered and verified. An example of this can be seen in AI’s Political 
Imprisonment in the People’s Republic of China. This report clearly states that the information 
comes from two sources: (1) official published documents and (2) personnel accounts. AI claims 
that official published documents “provide essential information on the official principles and 
institutions related to the penal policy of the PRC”.172  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Vines, Alex. “The Crisis of Anti-Persoal Mines” in Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and 
Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines 
172 To be specific AI used the information published in two collections published in Peking in the 
1950s: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fagui Huipian (Collection of Laws and Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China) and Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu faling Huipian (Collection of 
Laws and Ordinances of the Central People’s Government) (Political Imprisonment in the 
Peoples Republic of China (London: Amnesty International, 1978) 
	   61	  
The majority of the information found in these reports comes from interviews of victims, 
and, in the case of torture, from personal detainees and prisoners. In its report Torture in the 
Eighties, AI discusses the process by which it verifies the information it uses in its interviews. 
The standard “systematic interview” lasts between four to six hours.173 The questions are not 
known in advance by the interviewee and are designed to get the same information in different 
ways.174 AI will then compare its findings with any medical evidence concerning the 
interviewee’s health, both before and after torture. Whenever possible, AI attempts to draw on 
evidence from medical officials who have conducted interviews with victims.175 AI will even 
release a report entirely from the perspective of a victim, such as its report on prison camps in 
Argentina. In these types of reports, NGOs include even larger sections describing verification 
procedures. In this specific report, the two victims explained that they were able to remember so 
much during their 15 months of captivity because they realized early on that their ultimate goal 
was to escape -- as such, they were constantly alert to all their surroundings.176  
The purpose is this section is relatively straightforward: to be seen as a legitimate body 
within the international community, NGOs need to confirm that all the facts in their reports have 
come from reputable sources. This is especially true if the report is denouncing the actions of a 
state. One of the easiest ways that states counter the conclusions drawn by NGOs is to claim that 
the information is either incorrect or biased. This section helps to preemptively nullify this 
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argument, forcing to states to either come up with a different excuse or to actually examine their 
policies.  
Generally at this point the report moves to a third section that discusses specific cases. It 
is important to note that NGOs typically try to select their cases from all over the world. For 
example, in its report Torture in the Eighties, AI made sure to include a focus on torture that 
occurred in countries that were considered to be more liberal, such as Northern Ireland. This 
section generally begins with basic statistics from various sources. These statistics were often 
meant to startle the public in hopes of moving them towards action. To illustrate, Africa Watch 
concluded that the approximate ratio of amputees due to mine explosions to the general 
population in Angola is one to 470.177 By comparison, the US, which has a population of 220 
million, performed more than 10,000 amputations on patients due to trauma.178 The ICRC finds 
that “85 percent of the 528 mine-wounded were engaged, when wounded, in non-military 
activity such as farming, traveling between villages or tending cattle; 77 percent were returnee 
refugees.”179  
This section will then typically move to a description of the situation on the ground. It 
often includes a detailed description of common techniques to implement the issue: conditions of 
the facilities where the acts took place and the effects these issues have on the daily lives of 
victims. In its report on Argentina, AI describes one of the most infamous concentration camps, 
club atletico, located in the lower part of the Federal Capital. It was described as being “an 
underground, unventilated place, without any natural light, and it was very damp and very 
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hot.”180 Prisoners were forced to stand at all times and always had tight cloth blindfolds covering 
their eyes. The torture room was labeled the “operating theater” in attempt to further demean 
detainees. The only piece of furniture in the room was a “picana” (prod) and a metal table to 
which victims were attached.181  
 In Landmines, a key focus of the groundwork was to show that landmines have other 
lasting consequences besides physical ramifications. The first report to look at the 
socioeconomic consequences of landmines was After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy 
of Landmines, coauthored by Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams. Most of the victims of 
landmines live in the developing world, which are typically agrarian societies.182 In these 
societies, an amputee is considered to be an unproductive member, and thus just another mouth 
to feed.183 The Department of State concludes that landmines “provide a continuing element of 
chaos in countries striving for stability…the impact of un-cleared landmines on a developing 
economy is tremendous.”184 Families of victims have to deal with financial difficulties associated 
with medical costs, combined with the fact that in many cases one of the household earners can 
no longer work. 
This section then normally ends with quotes and stories from individual victims. In its 
report on the situation in Chile, AI medical examiners described the ordeal of Adriana Vargas 
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Vasquez, a 31-year old factory worker who had been tortured in March 1980.185 She received 
multiple courses of electrical shocks and was continuously hung up by her wrists.  Doctors 
observed small black scabs where electrodes had been applied along with “swelling and 
discolorations in places she had received blows.”186 She lost almost 6 kg while detained for four 
days and suffered from nausea for 20 days after her release.  
This third section usually takes the most space in the report, which is logical since in the 
beginning NGO networks are focused on bringing attention to the issue. Senator Patrick Leahy, 
in the introduction to Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, states that the Arms Project of HRW and 
PHR “have been instrumental in raising awareness of the urgent need to address the global 
landmines problem.”187 Through these reports, NGOs help to raise awareness about an issue by 
strengthening the ties between the domestic situation on the ground and the international 
community. This support makes the work of NGOs seem more legitimate since it represents 
those who would not otherwise have a voice in negotiations, in this case the victims. This is why 
combining statistics with first- hand accounts is so important because it gives the numbers actual 
real-world perspective. Both delegates and the general public can easily identify with this 
personal testimony thus allowing these reports to move negotiations towards a moral issue where 
the actions are seen as intolerable. As mentioned earlier, morality is an effective tool because it 
provides momentum for individuals to affect policy. Therefore, this section provides 
policymakers with a valuable resource that states will use during the next phase of negotiations. 
The value of this information will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.   
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The fourth and final section combines the theory provided from the first section with the 
data from the third section to come up with some sort of general conclusion. After analyzing data 
from clinics and hospitals, Asia Watch and PHR concluded, that Cambodia has “the highest 
percentage of physically disabled inhabitants of any country in the world.”188 Almost all these 
reports contain recommendations for the countries investigated or solutions to address the issue 
as a whole. In its report on the Philippines, AI recommended that the government make 
immediate inquiries into those individuals listed in the report as being victims of torture and the 
88 officers listed in the report as having employed torture.189 In A Coward’s War, Asia Watch 
and PHR called on the UN and ICRC to re-evaluate the 1980 CCW landmine protocol and urged 
governments to “seek advice from representatives of relief, medical, de-mining and military 
organizations.”190 
In some cases, these general conclusions include the provisions that the NGO thinks 
should appear in the treaty. In the case of Landmines, the reports would frequently discuss how 
an outright ban on AP mines was the only viable solution. Analyzing other possible solutions and 
then proving that they would not adequately address the problem accomplished this. For 
example, the general conclusion is that mine clearance efforts are typically poorly funded and 
organized. Most mine clearing tools are simple farm instruments, little more than one moving 
through the field with a stick.191 Also, mine-clearance is an extremely expensive endeavor. The 
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average mine costs between $10 and $20 while the average mine removal costs between $300 
and $1,000 a mine.192  
If available, NGOs like to include responses from the accused government in this final 
section. In the Philippine report, the government responded firstly stating that it regretted the AI 
mission had not adhered to the promises it made to the Philippine government.193 For example, 
the mission was “to report in confidence to the Secretary-General…and to make no public 
statements during to the course of its mission.”194 Further, the Philippine Government claims that 
Mr. Jones promised that the findings of the mission would be presented to government privately 
and no publicity would be made from the report. When part of the report was leaked to the press, 
AI used this as an excuse to publish the complete report, violating previous guarantees to the 
contrary.195  
The purpose of this third section is to accomplish the second and third condition that I 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Standard setting is one of the first steps of building a norm and is 
associated with what defines acceptable behavior. By providing information, NGOs are directly 
trying to sway delegations towards specific beliefs on what behaviors are morally unacceptable. 
The conclusions that NGOs draw and subsequent recommendations that they make in this final 
section are a more direct way for the general public to let states know what behavior they deem 
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abusive. Thus, these standards often serve as the basis for establishing the standards that will 
appear in a UN treaty.  
Finally, as Peter Simmons points out, the monitoring that NGOs performs in these reports 
“call attention to violations of the UN Declaration on Human Rights.”196 States do not exist to 
primarily report the truth; they are more than willing to hide or misreport information if it assists 
them in protecting their national interest. Scholars conclude that in many situations, normally 
ones where sovereignty concerns are low, it is easier to fix the problem than to deal with the 
resulting international pressure. In these instances, the mere mention of a violation can force 
states into compliance. My case studies seem to show that this theory is true, since merely 
publishing reports seem to have some effect on naming and shaming states into compliance.197  
For example, Greece withdrew itself from the Council of Europe after AI’s two-year 
investigation into allegations of torture.198 After publishing its report on Northern Ireland, the 
British government reluctantly accepted the findings of its own specially-appointed investigative 
commission that had come to similar conclusions. Of course, AI also met resistance from certain 
countries. After releasing its report on torture in Brazil in 1972, the Brazilian government banned 
any mention of AI in its press.199 In the case of Landmines, the United States was unwilling to 
accept the conclusion that the only solution was an outright ban for most of the negotiations. 
States are often reluctant to let AI monitor, however, refusing to grant access is often seen as an 
admission of guilt in itself. It is important to note that the most abusive states will often attempt 	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to clean up their act before a mission. This makes the work of NGOs harder, but it is almost 
impossible to erase all traces of abusive behavior. 
NGOs also use this information to distribute petitions throughout the international 
community. Similar to its ability to attract delegates, this information provides the necessary 
moral capital to gain access to the public’s time. It then provides the leverage that NGOs use to 
convince individuals to sign their petition. 
The main thrust of AI’s campaign was establishing its “Prisoner of Conscience 
Network”. AI attempted to balance its selection of prisoners between democratic states, 
communist bloc, and the third world. Ten or so AI supporters would adopt three prisoners from 
these separate categories.200 Once adopted, AI would write to these prisoners and their families 
and begin to work towards their release. Between 1970 and 1977, AI adopted more than 15,000 
prisoners and was able to secure the release of more than 9,000 prisoners.201 In 1973 AI moved 
from merely defending specific prisoners to calling for an outright ban on torture when it began 
to distribute a petition to all its members entitled “An International Appeal to Outlaw Torture”. 
In one year this petition had gained more than one million signatures from 85 countries. This 
petition was then sent to the President of the UN General Assembly.  
Concerning Landmines, PHR lobbied intensively in the US through a letter-writing and 
petition campaign based on the adoption of the Landmines Use Moratorium Act which was 
adopted by Congress as part of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill.202 In Cambodia the 
ICBL launched a massive signature campaign gathering names at temple, markets and schools 	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throughout the country.203 Leading up to negotiations in the UN, during a review conference of 
existing international law, the ICBL delivered a petition of 1 million signatures from people 
around the world calling for a ban.204  
Again I conclude that following the Cold War there was shift in the international 
community that abusive behavior will no longer be tolerated. The raising of awareness that 
results from the distribution of information contained in NGOs reports begins this spirit to build 
political momentum. This momentum is captured through petitions that show states the 
preferences of the general public. Combined with the information, NGOs use these petitions to 
attract the attention of delegates in the UN. It is extremely difficult for states to ignore the 
general public once an issue is on the agenda of the international community. Political 
momentum builds until the UN can no longer ignore the issue.  
However, the UN is often limited in the action it can take because it has to respect 
national sovereignty. During this early phase, NGOs can challenge state authority by redefining 
key international norms associated with the importance of sovereignty through the provision of 
information. Thus, the information NGOs gather through their monitoring activities provides a 
necessary function given this limit of the UN system. Once the issue is on the figurative 
international table, NGOs were able to gain access by sharing expertise that they have compiled 
in the various forms discussed in this chapter.   
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Chapter 4: Sovereignty the Sticking Point in Negotiations 
As mentioned briefly in the preceding chapter, once the UN had taken up the issue in 
both case studies, NGOs used the information they possess as leverage to gain access to 
delegates. In an interview with AI member Professor Susan Waltz, she asserts, “power is not in 
repacking and distributing information but collecting new information.”205 She claims that in 
many negotiations, NGOs gain access to negotiations because they possess information that is 
not available to states.206 Granted access is dependent upon acceptance of NGO reports as 
legitimate within the international community, and a motivating factor for undergoing the 
measures discussed in the previous chapters to document how they gathered information. 
Through the provision of information, NGOs can get their ideas into negotiations, even if they 
are banned from actual proceedings.  
 This chapter will shift away from the early stages of raising awareness about the issue 
and move towards an examination of the negotiations that go into drafting a treaty in the UN 
with a focus on the sticking points in negotiations where state preferences diverge, thus causing 
major debate. This chapter will center on one case study the CAT, where the major issues of 
concern were universal jurisdiction and implementation procedures that included verification 
measures. Through this discussion I will examine how, once granted an initial access point to 
UN negotiations, NGOs change their tactics to focus on advocacy techniques. I conclude this 
discussion by comparing the work of NGOs at this stage in negotiations to that of a domestic 
interest group.  	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Before beginning this discussion, however, it is necessary to give a brief background on 
how delegates interact during negotiations. An interview I conducted with the former US 
ambassador to Brazil, Melvyn Levitsky, provides a first-hand description of negotiations 
between member state delegations. In terms of the United States, delegations receive their 
instruction from the Department of State, and most states have a similar body.207 The head 
delegate receives both instructions on what the goals/interests are for delegation and a variety of 
information compiled by the State Department and the intelligence community.208 A majority of 
negotiation, according to Levitsky, is being aware of the personalities and positions of the other 
states involved.209 This allows the delegation to be aware of where there are parallel and 
conflicting interests that will appear during negotiations. Delegations must work to build a 
coalition of these like-minded states in order to counter opponents.  
For example, political action on torture was first taken up by the General Assembly with 
statements by the foreign ministers of Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands at the 28th session 
of the General Assembly. The Danish Foreign minister discussed how he was “alarmed by the 
many reports of torture.”210  
While NGOs were not directly present in these early negotiations, they were often 
referenced. During these early negotiations, states were still trying to gather as many facts as 
possible, such that NGOs such as AI were often approached for assistance. To illustrate, the 
Netherlands referred to reports from various parts of the world, which provide evidence that this 
“appalling practice has become rife and is often used against people suspected of having 	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committed a political offence.”211 Even more powerful states such as the Federal Republic of 
Germany mentioned the work of NGOs as proof of the prevalence of torture in the world, “ ‘non-
governmental organizations and the mass media’ maintained that torture was ‘one of the most 
serious and widespread forms of ill-treatment of human beings at the present day’.”212  
Further, since they were often denied access to proceedings NGOs began to hold side 
conferences that paralleled negotiations. These conferences may cover anything from debate on a 
specific clause to providing information to delegates before an upcoming session. Some 
conferences were held by AI to target its own members. During the campaign against torture, 
AI’s network spanned the entire globe. While AI allowed regional circumstances to dictate most 
of its national chapter strategies, large conferences were often convened to remind these regional 
groups of the overall international goal. For example, in 1975 AI held a Regional Conference in 
New Delhi, India. The purpose of this conference was to specifically discuss the development of 
AI programs in southern Asia.213 
Sweden introduced an AI sponsored draft resolution (no. 3059) at the General Assembly 
third committee, calling for the Assembly to examine the question of torture as a separate agenda 
item at its 29th session.214 Sweden had gained the support of the Danish, Irish, and Austrian 
delegations.215 Based on recommendations from Denmark, the resolution was slightly modified a 
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to include a standard setting provision that rejects any form of torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.216 Sweden submitted the resolution as a revised draft.  
In 1974 the agenda of the UN General Assembly contained an item “Torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and 
imprisonment.”217 The delegations of the Netherlands and Sweden collaborated with Austria and 
Ireland to edit and submit the draft resolution to the General Assembly on November 6, 1974. 218  
The General Assembly adopted it as Resolution 3218, calling on the 1975 Fifth UN Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders to Consider Rules Against Torture, 
Safeguards Against Arbitrary Detention to further examine the issue of torture.219 The principles 
established in this resolution would eventually serve as the basis for the Declaration against 
Torture.  
However, despite calling on states to obey existing international treaties, this resolution 
did not include a single clause about how the UN would attempt to locate member states that 
were still committing acts of torture (these provisions are known as fact-finding). At that time, 
there was little precedence for fact-finding and implementation clauses in international law, since 
the Cold War still dominated international relations, and thus member states were concerned 
about violations of their national sovereignty. Most of this monitoring work was done by NGOs, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. The member states that drafted this resolution were willing 	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to sacrifice this point in favor of mobility because they wanted to capitalize on the momentum 
caused by the human rights situation in Chile.220  
In preparation for the Fifth UN Congress, AI spent a year lobbying governments. During 
this time, it submitted a 16-page document with a series of recommendations and sponsored 
educational seminars.221 The Congress dealt with a number of problems concerning torture, as 
dictated by the General Assembly. Primarily, the Congress would be responsible for creating and 
then reporting to the General Assembly “an international code of ethics for police and related 
law enforcement agencies”, as well as elaborating upon the standards for the treatment of 
prisoners.222  
The Congress decided that torture was the most important issue at hand, so it created a 
working group to implement Resolution 3218.223 The working group concluded that the basis of 
its work would be turning article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into a new 
draft declaration.224 Based on this decision, the Swedish and Netherlands delegations submitted a 
draft recommendation that allowed the Congress to go beyond its original mandate, as stated in 
resolution 3218. It also allowed the Congress to forward the creation of a code of conduct for 
police officials to the UN Committee on Crime and Prevention Control.225 The major debates 
during drafting included developing a definition of torture and the relatively weak enforcement 
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procedures that only require states to try to implement the principles in the draft declaration.226 
NGOs were still involved in the negotiation process at this point, but mainly they were called 
upon to provide information and expertise. The working group then submitted the draft to the 
fourth session of the Congress, who made a few minor changes and then unanimously adopted 
it.227  
In June, 1975 AI sponsored a seminar in The Hague for police officials from eight 
different European countries. Out of this conference emerged a code of ethics for police officials, 
including a provision that justified police officers disobeying orders to inflict torture.228 This 
code was eventually distributed to member delegations of the Fifth UN Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders by the Netherlands. This Conference assisted 
the Congress by allowing it to focus on the elaboration of a draft declaration. 
Other smaller NGOs also met in 1975 to host similar conferences. The International 
Council of Nurses met in Singapore to adopt a resolution on the “Role of the Nurse in the Care 
of Detainees and Prisoners”. The World Medical Association met in Tokyo and adopted a 
Declaration of six articles containing “Guidelines for Medical Doctors concerning Torture…”229 
Furthermore, AI also collaborated with other NGOs during some of these conferences. In 
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collaboration with the ICJ, AI drafted a “Code of Ethics for Lawyers, relevant to Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment”.230  
Resolution 3452, also known as the Declaration Against Torture, was submitted to the 
UN General Assembly in December 1975 by the Netherlands. It contained four main sections: 
(1) rules against torture and ill-treatment, (2) safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, 
(3) professional ethics for police and analogous officials, and (4) professional ethics for medical 
personnel. Following the passing of the Declaration, the General Assembly passed Resolution 
3453, which called for the Commission on Human Rights to study the issue of torture, 
specifically to (1) “ensure the effective observance of the Declaration…” and (2) “the 
formulation of a body of principles for the protection of all detainees and prisoners.”231  
The death of Stephen Biko in South Africa, combined with the continued brutalities in 
Chile, provided additional momentum for the campaign in the UN. During the thirty-second 
session of the General Assembly, Sweden set in motion the drafting of a treaty against torture.232 
Sweden argued that the Declaration “should not be the ultimate goal of the United Nations’ 
efforts to protect all persons from torture, and that the works should lead up to a legally binding 
international instrument.”233 Further, in order to strengthen the Declaration during draft 
negotiations, the Assembly authorized the development of a questionnaire for distribution to 
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member states detailing their compliance with the DAT234 and encouraging governments to obey 
their eventual commitment to the CAT.235 
Between 1979 and 1984, the CHR requested that ECOSOC form an open-ended working 
group in order to draft concrete procedures.236 This group met each January for one week before 
the official start of that years’ CHR session.237 After its opening session, the Commission would 
change the pre-sessional working group into a sessional working group that would continue to 
work on the current draft. Being an open-ended working group means that no votes can be taken; 
thus decisions on textual changes in the current draft must be made by consensus.238 When 
consensus cannot be reached, the working group is obliged to report to the Commission the 
differing opinions expressed during the discussion of that provision.  
One of the conditions of an open-ended working group is that all CHR members can 
participate. Even states that were not members of the CHR could attend as official observers. 
NGOs that possessed consultative status with ECOSOC can also attend these sessions with the 
same observer status. However, in practice these sessions were only attended by 20 to 30 
delegations and most were Western countries.239 Frequent participants were Australia, France, 
the UK, and the US. Nonetheless, there were still a fair number of regular non-Western 
participants including Argentina, Brazil and the Soviet Union. 	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Although AI does not submit specific drafts during negotiations, other NGOs did submit 
draft conventions. The International Association of Penal Law (IAPL), in cooperation with the 
ICJ, sponsored the preparation of a draft convention declaring torture a crime under international 
law.240 It was submitted to the UN on January 15, 1978.241 Jean-Jacques Gautier, after studying 
torture, concluded that the only effective combative means is “a system of inspection through 
regular visits to all places of detention.”242 Through the his own NGO, Gautier convened a 
meeting of experts to prepare a first draft of a Convention concerning the Treatment of Persons 
Deprived of their Liberty. This draft established a supervisory commission that would have the 
authority to send a delegation authorized to visit any center of interrogation, detention, or 
imprisonment to states who are party to the convention.243 
In 1978 the Swedish government submitted a draft convention that would be the basis of 
most of the deliberation in the working group.244 This draft was chosen over the draft proposal 
submitted by the IAPL.245 It was primarily based on Declaration Against Torture, and thus 
contained many of the same elements. Despite the IAPL draft not being chosen, NGOs continued 
to lobby state delegations in more informal settings in order to ensure that a number of key 
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came up with a Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture.  
241 E/CN.4/NGO/213 
242 Burgers, J.H. 1998. The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the  
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Pg. 26. 
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principles were included, namely: (1) the obligation of states to extradite or try alleged torturers, 
(2) the universality of jurisdiction, (3) an effective implementation mechanism in the treaty, (4) 
extending all relevant provisions to ill-treatment, and (5) the rehabilitation of victims.246  
One of the most important, and subsequently controversial, additions discussed above 
was the clause found in Article 8 that established the “principle of “universality”. For the sake of 
brevity, this paper will focus on this particular sticking point. I chose this issue because it serves 
as one of the best representations of the tug-of-war between international law and state 
sovereignty. Given states concern about violations into national sovereignty, one concludes that 
they will argue much more strongly for a treaty that matches their individual preferences.  
Therefore, the influence of NGOs is made all the more significant given states reluctance to 
allow outside influences to dictate their national policy.  
Universality means that states should have jurisdiction over the crime of torture wherever 
it had been committed (even if this was outside the prosecuting state), and this authority should 
be used by a state if an individual accused of committing torture has been found in their 
territory.247 The purpose of universal jurisdiction is to make it very difficult for a torturer to find 
safe haven in a state that has ratified the Convention. However, this authority only holds if the 
state does not extradite the accused torturer based on the “principle of territoriality” and the 
“principle of nationality”.248  
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Pg. 58. 
248 The “principle of territory” states that a state has criminal jurisdiction when the offence was 
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Negotiations in the working group on this issue occurred between 1978 and 1983. 
Between 1978 and 1979, the working group requested that the SG invite governments to express 
their opinions on the Swedish draft. The Secretary General received comments from 17 
governments, which he subsequently compiled into a summary document and presented to the 
working group. 249 Many states were reluctant to allow universal jurisdiction for fear of losing 
some degree of national sovereignty. The leaders of those states using torture feared that they 
could be extradited and tried in a foreign court. Similarly, other nations such as the United States 
feared that their soldiers could be held accountable for following orders. The Soviet Union was 
concerned that universal jurisdiction could lead to increased conflict if a state did not recognize 
jurisdiction based on the principles of "nationality" or "territoriality".250 Italy concurred, stating 
that it would be desirable to establish an order of precedence for the different categories of 
jurisdiction.251  
At this point in negotiations, NGOs were limited in their involvement in negotiations. 
They could observe proceedings, but had to be invited by a member state to participate directly. 
For example, in 1979 AI was invited to speculate about how human rights would fare at the 
UN.252 Nigel Rodley was rather pessimistic, stating, “the best that could be hoped for was the 
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249 The Swedish draft was most well received by Austria, Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Norway, Portugal, Somalia, Switizerland, and the US (E/CN.4/1314 with Addenda 1, 
2, 3). 
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prevention of ‘erosion of such gains as have already been achieved’.”253 Further, he found that 
the 1503 procedure “has not even yielded…one thorough study or investigation.”254 Concerning 
the Campaign Against Torture, he cited the same problem that many states found with earlier 
drafts: that they did not do enough to secure compliance by member states.  
Progress on the issue of sovereignty was not really made until 1982. The working group 
tried a new strategy: instead of focusing on achieving consensus, it would identify certain key 
issues and explore different solutions.255 It would then present all these solutions to either the 
CHR or the General Assembly, who did not have to reach consensus, but could instead bring 
each issue to vote.256 By this point, Swedish draft (which had undergone multiple revisions) 
gained the support of the Netherlands, France, the United States, and, finally Australia.257  
However, countries such as Brazil were still concerned that universal jurisdiction could 
be used for political reasons. States could hold trials accusing Brazilian citizens on false 
evidence in order to pressure the Brazilian government. The delegation suggested a similar 
proposal to an earlier one withdrawn by the Netherlands that makes the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction dependent on the refusal of a request for extradition.258  
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Brazil was eventually satisfied by a chairman recommendation that proposed a slight 
change to article 7. The change ensured that the evidence required to invoke universal 
jurisdiction would match that necessary for jurisdiction based on nationality or territoriality.259 
With this addition, the remaining articles referring to universal jurisdiction of the Swedish draft 
would remain the same.260 However, Brazil did submit the proposal that universal jurisdiction 
would apply under certain conditions only if “the states of territorial or national jurisdiction did 
not request extradition with a set period or if such a request were denied.261 
In 1984 AI once again conducted a worldwide survey to update its findings from its 
survey.262 The survey found that torture was still very much a problem in the world.263 Following 
this pressure, the working group was able to achieve consensus on almost all the provisions of 
the draft convention, including universal jurisdiction. Scholars assert that this progress was made 
for four separate reasons: “(1) radical change in the Argentine position after the end of the 
Pinochet military rule; (2) active support of the Senegalese delegation; (3) the constructive role 
of the Indian delegation; and (4) the flexible and cooperative attitude of the Soviet 
delegation.”264 The only major remaining points of contention involved article 20 and the second 
half of article 19, both of which concerned implementation of the treaty.  
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At this point the Chairman concluded, “the work of the Group had reached a stage which 
made it desirable that the Commission itself should devote a substantial debate to the draft 
convention well before the close of the session.”265 NGOs were once again able to participate 
during the debate in the Commission. Statements were made on the behalf of AI, the IAPL, and 
the ICJ. The SG of AI, Thomas Hammarberg, even made a statement before the entire CHR. The 
CHR decided to submit the draft through ECOSOC to the General Assembly, and assigned them 
the task of resolving the remaining points of contention.266 The CHR also included the report of 
the Working Group and the summary records of the Commissions debate.  
During this session of the General Assembly, states that had previously been absent from 
the debate began to participate in negotiations. More than 30 governments responded to the 
request of the SG to comment on the submitted draft convention, with almost half of these 
comments from states that did not participate in the working group.267 Support for the draft was 
not as large in the Assembly as the CHR, since many African and Asian states had misgivings 
about the current draft convention.268 Most had difficulties with the inquiry and implementation 
system of article 20, and some went as far as to state that the article should be eliminated 
entirely. A compromise was reached by making certain changes to the two articles based on a 
Byelorussian proposal. Furthermore, Article 28 was added, allowing amendments in case the 
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political landscape changed after a state has ratified the convention.269 Still, delegations such as 
Syria, Turkey, Japan, Tunisia, Bangledesh, and Romania thought that the convention required 
further discussion to reach complete consensus on all provisions.270 On December 10, 1994 the 
General Assembly adopted without vote the draft resolution as submitted by the third committee 
and opened it for “signature, ratification, and accession.”271  
In the last analysis, nearly every sticking point in international negotiations revolves 
around the issue of sovereignty. States are concerned that outside influences may complicate the 
drafting process and lead to a final treaty that does not match their preferences. This limits the 
role of NGOs once negotiations have begun compared to the awareness raising stage. Banning 
torture is an issue that would likely have an effect on the domestic legislation of most states. 
However, while independent influence may be lower than in earlier stages, that does not mean it 
is nonexistent once negotiations have begun. 
My earlier analysis on the work of previous scholars discussed how interest groups lobby 
governments in order to get their preferences represented in domestic legislation. This case study 
supports my initial hypothesis that this theory could be applied to international relations was 
correct. Not only do NGOs work in the domestic sphere, but also they take this a step further by 
lobbying state delegations in order to get their preferences included in treaties. One of the major 
roles of interest groups is the provision of information. As seen in the discussion above, the work 
of NGOs was regularly referenced by state delegations during negotiations in the working group. 
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Still, ignoring the effects of framing as discussed in the previous chapter, it was the states 
themselves that were determining what to do with this information. For instance, Norway’s 
Foreign Minister, during discussions, took the time to acknowledge, “the work carried out by AI 
and the campaign against torture.”272  
However, I would argue that the information distributed by NGOs provided the necessary 
momentum to move negotiations forward. The catalysts of this movement, states such as 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, lack the political clout of larger states such as the US or 
China. Nonetheless, they do possess a characteristic that during negotiations in the CAT seemed 
just as important, a good reputation in international relations. There are many comparisons that 
can be drawn from the relationship between large vs. middle sized states and interest groups vs. 
NGOs. In both categories, the latter lacks either the military or economic resources necessary to 
coerce states towards a given action. Therefore, they have to rely on persuasion to sway member 
states towards their preferences. 
Once negotiations have begun, from the preceding discussion, it appears that NGOs 
posses two main interrelated resources of persuasion at their disposal. The first, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, is the power of the information they can provide. The second is their ability 
to “name and shame” states into compliance with this information. Not only does the information 
NGOs provide grant them access to negotiations, it more importantly acts as the capital 
necessary for medium-sized states to gain access to the time of their larger counterparts, thereby 
moving negotiations forward. To illustrate, Bulgaria, a state with a less than stellar human rights 
record, referred to the report issued by AI after it sent a delegation to Chile.  
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A lot of the momentum in the CAT can be attributed to changing political dynamics, 
especially in Latin America. However, it was the monitoring done by NGOs that brought this 
problem to light. For example, the information that AI provided in its second worldwide survey 
in 1984 showed that torture was still a problem. This caused the working group to realize that the 
longer they delayed, the worse the situation would become and drove them to reach consensus on 
almost all issues that very year. The delegations of Argentina, the Netherlands and Sweden 
decided they could no longer delay and submitted a proposal to adopt the convention before the 
Third Committee. They felt pushed towards this action when they heard rumors that certain 
states planned on a draft resolution that would delay the examination of the draft convention by 
the GA until the following session next year.273  
Moreover, interest group theory from other scholars emphasizes that these groups often 
help to solve a principal-agent problem, where the agent may not understand the preferences of 
the principals it represents. Interest groups serve as the connector between a state and its citizens, 
thus solving this problem. My case study on the CAT shows how NGOs serve a similar function 
by gaining an understanding of negotiations.  Through their established networks, NGOs can 
pass on information to their domestic constituents. One of the ways that NGOs serve as the 
connector, as seen above, is by hosting of parallel conferences. A large portion of AI’s success in 
the CAT can be attributed to its ability to take grassroots campaigns and apply them to a flexible 
international agenda. This can be seen in AI’s regional conference in New Delhi. These 
conferences can also help to streamline negotiations by assisting states in drafting certain 
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clauses. For instance, the AI seminar in the Hague in 19XX led directly to the creation of a code 
of ethics for police officials. 
This ability to serve as connectors did give NGOs some degree of influence during 
negotiations in the working group. Once NGOs have informed domestic constituents of events 
occurring during negotiations, they can then in turn pass on the domestic audiences’ opinion to 
state delegations. This domestic opinion can often pressure states to move in a certain direction. 
Ambassador Levitsky emphasizes that one of the most difficult parts of negotiations is striking a 
balance between the secrecy required for delicate compromise and the ultimate ratification 
necessary in dualist countries. Therefore, he asserts, “NGOs can make something very hard to 
ratify by exposing its duplicity.”274 
This can be seen by the certain degree of success that NGOs had in lobbying for the 
inclusion of certain textual provisions in the CAT. In the case of the issue of universal 
jurisdiction, while most of the political pressure was accomplished by states without the 
assistance of NGOs, this provision would most likely have not been included in the final 
convention without their efforts. For example, the United Kingdom was extremely reluctant to 
consider even the smallest degree of extraterritorial jurisdiction until domestic AI offices began 
to pressure members of parliament.275  
The inclusion of universal jurisdiction was actually successful in combating the situation 
in Chile, which as discussed earlier in the chapter was one of the major motivating factors 
leading to the CAT. In October 1998, a Spanish magistrate “indicted Augosto Pinochet on a 
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number of human rights violations, including torture committed after his government had ratified 
the Convention a decade earlier.”276 Pinochet was placed under house arrest, and when he 
returned to Chile, he faced prosecution for the remainder of his life.  
The next chapter will turn to a discussion of my second case study on Landmines. In both 
negotiations, NGOs collaborated with states to overcome these difficulties; however, in the 
Landmines Convention, the work of NGOs was much more visible.  It is natural to conclude that 
NGOs therefore had a greater degree of influence over the proceedings. Further, scholars 
conclude that the final pushing factor that led to the submission of a draft convention of the CAT 
was changes in the political landscape, such as the fall of the Pinochet Regime in Chile. This was 
not the case in Landmines; if anything, the political scene was working against the speedy 
ratification of a convention. Finally, most scholars agree that the Landmines Convention was the 
first time that negotiations ended with a treaty stronger than the draft on which negotiations were 
originally based. The next chapter will compare the CAT to Landmines in order to theorize why 
NGOs seemed to have a larger degree of influence.  
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Chapter 5: The ICBL Moves Past Basic Interest Group Theory 
This final chapter turns to an examination of my second case study, the Ottawa 
Convention Banning Landmines. An examination of my second case study revealed that the 
work of the ICBL is much more visible then AI’s work in CAT. This increased visibility seems 
to correlate with increased influence over state delegations. Therefore, this chapter seeks to 
answer; why were NGOs in the Landmines Convention able to have a greater amount of 
influence over negotiation proceedings than in the CAT?  
This is not to downplay the work of NGOs during the CAT process.  Instead I wish to 
examine why, despite being allowed to participate in pre-sessional working groups as observers 
in the CAT, NGOs are almost always mentioned in the negotiation records only once drafting 
had begun. This compares to the Landmines Convention, where the ICBL not only assisted in 
drafting actual text, but also assisted states such as Canada in dictating policy for the campaign. 
Again this chapter will focus on state’s positions during negotiations and the strategies employed 
by NGOs to influence these past a specific sticking point: in this case the actual ban of AP 
mines. I will examine whether the ICBL employed different strategies from those used in the 
CAT, or whether there were other political factors that came into play affecting negotiation 
proceedings. 
At the end of the conference, the ICBL arranged for the Ekos Research Associates to 
design and conduct a focus group discussion with delegates at the Ottawa Conference.277 The 
purpose of this survey was to determine the key aspects that led to the success of the Ottawa 
Conference. I have narrowed down the results of this comprehensive survey into three points: (1) 
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(2) joining a coalition of like-minded states, and (3) moving negotiations outside the traditional 
disarmament method in the UN.  
In the previous chapter I compared the work of NGOs to that done by domestic interest 
groups. I conclude that the survey fails to make the connection between the success ICBL via its 
ability able to move past the typical interest group theory consisting of providing information 
and lobbying individual delegates as seen the CAT. The ICBL, to an even greater degree than 
AI, recognized even though it did not possess the military or economic resource of a state, it had 
plenty to bring to the table.  
There were two key events before the Landmine issue even began to build momentum in 
civil society and the UN. Additional protocols were added to the Geneva Convention through the 
1980 Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Weapons (CCW). 
Restrictions on the use of AP mines are defined in the CCW’s Protocol II. The Protocol was 
designed to reduce civilian casualties by reducing the way AP mines could be used.278 The 
second event did not occur until almost a decade later in 1992 when the United States, through 
the efforts of Senator Patrick Leahy, passed a bill in the Senate that established a one-year 
moratorium on the export and transfer of AP mines (WWF-Wareham). During this time, the 
United States Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL), a subset of the ICBL, worked closely with 
the offices of Senator Leahy.279 During an early meeting, the senator’s staffer Tim Rieser, 
informed ICBL director Jody Williams that Leahy would be willing to enter the campaign into 
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279 His involvement with the landmine issue dated back to the 1980s when he visited a field 
hospital on the Honduran border. There he met a boy who had lost a leg to landmines (Wareham, 
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the congressional record.280 This established a partnership between Leahy and the ICBL that 
would last the entire campaign.  
Momentum in the UN increased because of an effective campaign by the ICBL 
requesting a reevaluation of the CCW.281 The campaign directly resulted in Francois Mitterand's 
call for a review of the CCW on an official visit to Cambodia.282 In an interview, Ms. Williams 
claimed that President Mitterrand called for this review to get “the NGOs and the French 
public…off his back.”283 On December 16, 1993, the General Assembly adopted the French 
resolution calling on the SG, in his role as CCW expository, to organize a review conference.284 
A Mexican amendment to this Resolution called on the Review conference to establish an 
outright ban on AP mines. A year earlier this position would have been unachievable, but the 
movement towards an outright ban had gained the support of states such as Austria, Belgium, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
The US was one of only three countries to abstain from the resolution. Despite support 
from Leahy and UN Ambassador Madeline Albright, the Pentagon actively campaigned against 
the resolution.285 At this point, the Pentagon’s position against an outright ban of AP mines was 
strengthened by the release of a report from all seven of the U.S. regional Commanders-In Chiefs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Jody Williams, ‘Notes on meeting with Tim Rieser, Leahy’s aid’, memorandum to Bobby 
Muller, John Terzano, Tom  Cardamone, and VVAF staff, 5 Dec. 1991. 
281 The previous release of SG Boutros Boutros Ghali’s paper, “An Agenda for Peace”, 
designated The Department of Humanitarian Affairs as the focal point for mine-related activities. 
282 Part of this pressure included an updated edition of the Coward’s War which it distributed to 
all European Parliament members (Rutherford). The United States was unable to call a review on 
the conference since it was not a part of protocol II (Rutherford). 
283 Mitterrand had received a number letters from HI alerting him to the urgent need for action on 
the landmines issue (Chabasse, Philippe “The French Campaign”).  
284 Rutherford, Kenneth. Disarming States: The International Movement to Ban Landmines 
285 Albright wrote a confidential letter to President Clinton informing him that current US policy 
would not lead to the elimination of landmines “in our lifetime”. This letter was eventually 
leaked to the New York Times. (Raymond Bonner, ‘Pentagon Weighs Ending Opposition to a 
Ban on Mines’, New York Time, 17 March. 1996).  
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(CINC) analyzing the perceived utility of landmines. Only the CINC responsible for Korea 
argued for the retention of AP mines, but this location was deemed too strategic to support an 
outright ban.286  Nonetheless President Clinton maintained that the US was committed to 
combating the problem of landmines. On October 7, 1994, the US State Department held a 
briefing to outline their proposed “Landmine Control Regime” (WWF-Wareham).  This regime 
proposed a four-track system focused on demining, export moratoriums, development of an AP 
landmine control regime, and strengthening the CCW (CCF-McNamara).  
In response to increased resistance from the US, ICBL members organized the 
international conference “The Human and Socio-Economic Impact of Landmines: Towards an 
International Ban” in Cambodia. Here the ICBL established its “Phnom Penh” formula that 
would serve as the basis of the ICBL strategy for the remainder of the Landmine campaign.287 
The formula recognized that while a cohesive overall strategy is necessary, it needs to be flexible 
enough to adjust to cultural and regional differences. On-site missions to collect information 
should continue, but they should also focus on educating local populations on advocacy 
techniques.288  
The Phnom Penh formula marked a turning point in Landmine negotiations, whereby the 
ICBL came to a realization that a multidisciplinary approach was needed. Most scholars, and the 
survey conducted by the Ekos research division, conclude that the crux of this approach was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Wareham, Mary. “Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the United States” in  
Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The 
Global Movement to Ban Landmines.  
287 The “Phnom Penh” formula was based on non-violent peace walks known as Cambodian 
Dhammayietras where 4,000-7,000 Buddhist monks walked through local Cambodian 
communities promoting peace (Rutherford). 
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seeking out the support of specialists in a variety of fields (such as medical and economic 
development), and not just foreign affair experts (Clearing, Cahill). However, from my analysis I 
conclude that there are two components towards a multidisciplinary approach that scholars are 
neglecting to consider: (1) victims representing themselves in negotiations and (2) the use of 
other media besides reports to highlight the brutality of landmines. Both of these characteristics 
can be seen in the strategy behind the Phnom Penh formula that was applied to the CCW review 
conference.  
The official Review Conference of the CCW occurred three years after the original 
resolution, between April 22-May 3, 1996 in Vienna, Austria. The ICBL sent a team of 
organizers to Vienna weeks in advance to assist the Austrian government in its preparations. This 
review conference was the first time that victims were physically able to testify before delegates. 
Ken Rutherford discussed his experience working in Somalia with the International Rescue 
Committee.289 He vividly described how “after the explosion, I saw my foot lying on the 
floorboard of the car. I thought, ‘Is it mine?’ I kept trying to put it back on. I dragged myself out 
of the car and called for help on my radio.”290   
Further, sticking with the Phnom Penh formula that I highlight, Pax Chrisiti, a member of 
Save the Children Austria, arranged for six tons of shoes to be delivered to the Austrian 
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parliament.  Each pair represented a child affected by AP mines.291 The ICBL published a 
weekly “CCW News” which ran stories on particular activists, delegations and regularly reported 
on state positions. One of the most popular columns, “The Good, The Bad and the Ugly”, caused 
a lot of anger among states because of its criticism, but “it also pressured them to bring their 
public statements in line with the realities of their negotiating positions or vice versa.”292 A 
member of the USBCL, Lora Lumpe, described the work done at the two CCW conferences as 
something that had never been seen before: “they had a newsletter, mines laid on the floor, 
videos showing between delegates’ meetings and very aggressive lobbying, pigeonholing, and 
brow beating of delegates.”293 
It was not just the ICBL who began to take this approach; the ICRC realized the 
stigmatization of the use AP mines in the public conscience could not be achieved by merely 
relying on written reports. The ICRC began to release a series of TV spots and print 
announcements that focused on the humanitarian costs of AP mines.294 Jerry White, working 
with the Landmines Victim Assistance (LVA), organized the “We Are Outraged” Conference so 
that survivors from Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, England, Bosnia, and the United 
States could come together to express their anger at the lack of action by diplomats. One by one, 
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survivors came before the group removing their prosthetic limbs, and then described their 
personal stories to conference attendees.295  
A comparison to my previous case illustrates the difference in approach taken by the 
ICBL. While AI in the CAT also emphasized that torture should be addressed because of moral 
concerns, they did not move beyond the traditional lobbying techniques of providing reports and 
lobbying for textual provisions associated with existing interest group theory. Moving beyond 
this theory was how the ICBL shifted the debate from one based on security, a topic where 
sovereignty concerns dominate debate, to a humanitarian framework, where it is much easier to 
condemn state behavior. This significantly increased the pace of negotiations, since it highlighted 
the paradox that while delegates were haggling over minor textual points, nameless civilians 
were dying en masse because of landmines. While the use of specialists added increased 
legitimacy to the NGO campaign, an analysis of this case study shows that it was the additional 
two conditions that I identified earlier in the chapter that really allowed the ICBL to move 
beyond the traditional interest group theory. 	  
In the CAT, victims were represented by NGOs, such as AI, whose workers in most cases 
were not actual victims, but third party advocates. I still maintain that the conduit role that AI 
served between domestic constituents and states was extremely important to move negotiations 
past sovereignty concerns. What I would argue instead is that the ICBL took this a step further 
through the Ottawa Process. For the first time, victims held positions of power in NGOs (such as 
the work of Ken Rutherford, or Jerry White in LVA) and were thus able to represent themselves 
in negotiations. There was now a direct link between the victims of Landmines and the state 	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delegations that represented them in negotiations. Again, as presented in the last chapter, it is 
very difficult for state delegations to completely ignore the opinion of their constituents.  
Further, instead of relying upon reports, the ICBL decided to combine this method with 
additional visual methods (such as pyramids of shoes, the “CCW News, or the release of ICRC 
television spots) to present information to delegates. It hoped that painting the personal story 
behind the statistics would attract delegate’s attention -- a visual image can quickly elicit an 
emotional response, while a report may just be pushed aside during a busy schedule.  
It seems that this approach was relatively successful; since progress was made when 
Swedish parliament, under pressure from the ICBL, followed France’s lead and voted that the 
government should publicly declare its support of a total ban.296 Australia’s Minister for 
Defense, Science and Personnel announced that his country was replacing its AP mines with 
self-destructing mines as the “technology in producing and self-destructing and deactivating is 
readily available.”297 However, there were still other countries besides the United States who 
favored the continued use of AP mines. Li Change, the Chinese delegate, reminded his peers 
“mines are effective defensive weapons for many countries, especially the larger number of 
developing countries, to resist foreign aggression.”298  
The ICBL stumbled when, towards the end of the conference, without NGO support, the 
US and Britain presented a 12-point program that would bind signatories to cut stocks and stop 
exports of conventional mines, but would then replace them with “smart mines.”299  Smart mines 
were included in this plan because of an intense lobbying campaign by American business 	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experts. For example, C.M. Welch, the chairman of Delaware-based Mohawk Electrical 
Systems, wrote Leahy to protest his moratorium, claiming that its extension could result in the 
loss of as many as 2,000 positions among the U.S. contractors.”300 Through this program, the US 
and UK made clear that they believed the original CCW conclusion that casualties of AP mines 
were merely the result of improper usage.301  
The release of this report, combined with the fact the convention relied on consensus 
voting, stalled negotiations, leading to a second review conference held in Geneva in January 
1996. This session was extended to a third and final review between April 22 and May 3. During 
this final conference, the ICBL worked hard to recapture the momentum found at the beginning 
the first review. It continued its strategy of using visual images to guilt the conscience of 
member delegates.  For instance, landmine survivors (many in wheelchairs) greeted delegates on 
the first day of the second review conference with red roses that were marked with the name of a 
landmine victim.302 Further, Ken Rutherford and Un Channareth introduced the “Wall of 
Remembrance”, a photographic collection of mine victims from Battambang Province, 
Cambodia.  The wall also included a timer that clicked every 20 minutes, signaling that another 
individual had become a victim of landmines. A staggering 250,000 Cambodians were injured 
between the closing of the Vienna Review Conference and the beginning of the Geneva 
Conference. 
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The second and third review conferences also marked an increased focus on regional 
strategy that established mine-free zones as the building blocks for an outright ban.303 For 
example, a major part of the regional strategy in the United States consisted of organizing 
protests against mine producing companies. The USCBL worked with a religious order, the 
School of Sisters of Notre Dame, to purchase shares in Alliant Tech, a major AP mine producer. 
As owners of shares, the Sisters were able to elicit discussions of the humanitarian costs of AP 
mines during shareholder meetings.304 The USCBL even assisted Ariel Brugger in taking a 
1,600-mile interfaith pilgrimage through the US calling for a ban on landmines. One of the most 
interesting visual examples used to target a wide audience was a Batman and Superman comic 
about AP mines that included an introduction by Senator Leahy. It is estimated that these comics 
reached thousands of American children and adults.305  
Despite this advocacy work, the conference continued to only make minor adjustments to 
the existing CCW treaty. The definition of an AP mine moved backwards since it was now 
defined as a weapon “primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of 
person.”306 The purpose of this was so anti-vehicles (AV) mines or mines that have more than 
one use (hybrid mines) do not fall under the definition.307 However, the use of “primarily” 
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allowed for many loopholes.308 Furthermore, the amended CCW Protocol II would give countries 
up to 9 years to get rid of stockpiles of “dumb” mines, but did not specify how this should be 
achieved. Senator Leahy classified the final result of the review conference as a “deplorable 
failure”.309  
Following the failure of the CCW Review Conference, the ICBL realized that a reliance 
on the Phnom formula was not enough.  As the ICRC stated, it was “convinced that the ‘public 
conscience’ of people throughout the world is revolted by the indiscriminate nature of AP 
mines... or [T]he question now before us is whether there is sufficient political will to establish 
an absolute prohibition on these weapons and to ensure respect for such a norm.” 310 This leads 
to the somewhat paradoxical result of the Ekon survey, that when moving towards a treaty a 
partnership with other like-minded states is necessary if NGOs hope to have independent 
influence. More importantly, this partnership allowed the ICBL to apply the momentum civil 
society built in earlier stages to push states towards action. One activist stated this “decision 
turned out to be of pivotal importance…as the only way to maintain movement…and (move) the 
issue forward.”311 
Therefore, the ICBL decided to focus on getting a group of pro-ban states together to 
work as bloc to push an AP mine ban through the UN. Pieter van Rossem of Paxi Christi 
Netherlands proposed the idea, wanting to bring together the ICBL with governments on his 
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“good guys list”.312 Just before the end of the CCW process, when it was realized that a desired 
outcome would not be reached, Quaker Activist Doug Atwood held a meeting at his house to 
discuss what steps ban proponents should take next.313 Besides the ICBL, Atwood invited the 
following states: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, New Zealand and Peru. At this 
meeting Canadian Ambassador Mark Moher announced Canada’s intention to hold a strategy 
conference in Ottawa later that year for all states that were in support of ban against AP mines.314  
This announcement came somewhat as a surprise, as prior to the Ottawa Conference the 
Canadian government had been in favor of the use of landmines because of their military utility. 
Although the Canadian government had not used landmines since Korea, it still felt that its 
soldiers would be in jeopardy without their use.315 This changed in 1993 with the election of a 
liberal government, and when Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet took up the 
issue. Ouellet argued that landmines should not only be banned in Canada, but the rest of the 
world.316 Nonetheless, NGOs were extremely concerned that a government seemed to separate 
the humanitarian and military aspects of the issue by only sending a representative of the 
Defense and the Arms Control Division, without a member from the human Security Division, to 
negotiations. 
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Much of the change in Canadian policy can be attributed to the work of the NGO Mines 
Action Canada (MAC). MAC realized that it needed motivate Canadian citizens to pressure their 
government towards a ban. To do this, MAC emphasized the indiscriminate nature of landmines 
by providing informational brochures filled with statistics from mine-affected states. It combined 
this with various presentations by individuals who told the story of how they became victims. It 
even arranged the unorthodox cross-Canada tour to raise awareness about the issue of landmines 
by Canadian musician Bruce Cockburn and Mozambican singer Chude Mondlane.317 On the 
other hand, the Department of National Defense also lobbied citizens, arguing that changes in 
minefield mapping and marking would ensure the safety of civilians.   
Canada was placed on Christi’s “good guys” list following Ambassador Moher’s 
announcement that Canada had placed a moratorium on the production, transfer, and operation of 
AP mines.318 At the end of the CCW review conference, Canada fulfilled Moher’s earlier 
promise by holding a joint conference with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 
UNICEF and the ICBL to officially call on pro-ban states to discuss banning the use of 
landmines.319 This began the Ottawa Process, a real movement towards progress in negotiations 
marked by the Canadian government’s partnership with the ICBL. The process would follow 
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administration (Tomlin). Axworthy’s speech was also actually developed by Lysyshyn, including 
the decision to keep other states in the dark (Tomlin). 	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two- track negotiations, where a series of meetings would be held to prepare and consult on the 
text of the treaty concurrently with intense campaigning efforts to build support for a ban.320 
In addition to forging a partnership with Canada, both the ICBL and the ICRC 
established partnerships with regional blocs. For example, in collaboration with the government 
of Zimbabwe, the ICBL sponsored a meeting in Harare that was attended by officials from the 12 
states of the Southern African Development Community. Additionally, in July 1997 the ICRC 
hosted a regional conference in collaboration with the Philippine government for experts in 
Asian military and strategic studies to examine the use of AP mines in Asia.321 States partnered 
with the ICBL also understood the importance of forging links with strong regional coalitions. 
Canadian consultations with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) led to the agreement that 
Canada would partner with the OAU and the ICBL to host an Africa-wide landmines conference 
in Kempton Park, South Africa.322 
Not only did the ICBL seek collaboration with states, but it also attempted to forge 
partnerships with important political and celebrity figures. For instance, Princess Diana of Wales 
was enlisted by the ICBL as an important advocate after her visit to Angola as a guest of the 
British ICRC. Both the ICRC and ICBL distributed through their networks pictures of her 
walking through minefields and meeting with victims. While Diana received much criticism 
from her Tory government for critiquing their position against a complete ban, she continued her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Hubert, Don. 2004. “‘New’ Humanitarian Advocacy? Civil Society and the Landmines 
Treaty.” 
321 Maslen, Stuart. “The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross” in Cameron, 
Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The Global 
Movement to Ban Landmines. 
322 Lawson et al. “The Ottawa Process and Internatonal Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel 
Mines” in Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without 
Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. 	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efforts stating: “I am not a political figure. I’d like to reiterate now, my intentions are 
humanitarian. That is why I felt drawn to this human tragedy.”323  
By the time negotiations were ready to begin again, the ICBL had established 
partnerships with states and other actors representing diverse issues and views. The ICBL would 
rely on these states to lobby other delegations during negotiations. From these partnerships, one 
could ascertain that the work of Deardorff concerning interest groups would be accurate. Again, 
according to this strain of thought, interest groups will lobby their strongest allies and then assist 
them in achieving their goals. This would be a logical conclusion, considering access to 
negotiation is granted by states in the Committee on NGOs. However, I conclude that the two 
conflicting interest group theories are actually interrelated. The ICBL unknowingly combined 
these two theories to move past the existing literature concerning traditional interest group 
theory.  
Again this movement away from typical interest group theory is best captured by a 
comparison between the CAT and Landmines. While AI was included in many discussions 
during CAT negotiations, it was unable to completely integrate itself into a strong coalition of 
like-minded states, where its role would be greater than just providing specific expertise. 
Nonetheless, the pro-ban states that the ICBL partnered with are similar to the ones that AI had 
involvement with in the CAT. These states were typically medium-sized and did not have a lot of 
political clout within the UN, but did possess a good reputation within the international 
community. The provision of information, combined with the reputation of these medium states 
(who already have greater resources at their disposal than NGOs), provides the necessary capital 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 White and Rutherford. “The Role of Landmine Survivors Network” in Cameron, Maxwell, 
Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to 
Ban Landmines. Pg. 103. 	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to overcome great power opposition. The process of exchanging information was greatly 
simplified when the ICBL decided to partner with pro-ban states, which follows Deardorff’s 
theory that interest groups can streamline proceedings. However, relative to independent 
influence in negotiations, this partnership allowed the ICBL to dictate would be done with the 
information, whereas in the CAT, AI lost a significant amount of power once they distributed 
their information (again ignoring framing effects).  
Not only was the ICBL able to integrate itself within a coalition of member states, but it 
also created new coalitions itself bringing together NGOs with differing mission statements 
under one banner. A majority of the success of the ICBL can be attributed to the flexibility of its 
organization to adapt different regional circumstances to an overall mission. In the CAT, AI and 
other NGOs merely used their connections to domestic constituents to pressure abusive states 
themselves. Once partnered with member states, this broad coalition allowed the ICBL to 
connect its pro-ban state partners to a variety of domestic constituents. States, who typically have 
more success than NGOs, can in turn pressure other states toward a ban using this domestic 
pressure. This is why I conclude a partnership between states and NGOS with similar 
preferences can actually strengthen the ties between the international community and grassroots 
movements. 
The U.S. was not pleased with Axworthy’s announcement at Ottawa, claiming that it 
would not join this process. Instead, with backing from the UK and France, it would follow 
procedure and focus its negotiation efforts through the Conference on Disarmament (CD).324 
Additional supporters of the CD were Australia, Germany, Spain, and Finland. Supporters of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 While both the UK and France were in support of a ban, they felt that the Ottawa Conference 
would not keep states from using mines against their citizens.  
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CD argued a ban was within itself a disarmament treaty: and therefore, the CD was the proper 
location in the UN for negotiations to occur.325  
The publication of “An Open Letter Clinton” in the New York Times forced the Clinton 
administration to make some concessions to appease the USBL.326 First, it would eventually 
support a permanent ban, but only an immediate ban would be placed on the use of ‘dumb’ or 
non-self destructing AP mines. An exception would be made for mine use in the Korean 
Peninsula until the situation between North and South Korea was resolved.327 Furthermore, the 
US reserved the right to use ‘smart’, or self-destruct and/or self-deactivating AP mines, until the 
ban takes place.328 
Despite these minor concessions by the US, progress in the CD was limited due to 
consensus voting.  This leads me to the Ekos’s survey third conclusion of how the ICBL was 
able to influence negotiations. When the ICBL and pro-ban states realized that a ban would not 
emerge out of the CD, they moved negotiations away from this process. This allowed the ICBL 
and core groups to no longer worry about achieving consensus with all of the major military 
powers. This compares to the traditional state-centered approach used in the CAT, where 
drafting sessions occurred in closed door working groups attended by member states and NGOs 
by invitation only. The closest that AI came to moving negotiations away from the traditional 
UN forum was hosting parallel conferences.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Hubert, Don. 2004. “‘New’ Humanitarian Advocacy? Civil Society and the Landmines 
Treaty.” 
326 This document contained important signatures from military experts, such as general Norman 
Schwarzkopf, arguing that an AP mine ban would not be detrimental to US military interests. It 
stated that ban was not only humane, but a military responsibility (WWF- Wareham and 
Maslem). 
327 USCBL, “New” Clinton landmines policy rejected by Campaign’ press statement, 15 May 
1996.  
328 USCBL, ‘Clinton Announcement Sends “mistaken” Signal on Landmines’, press statement, 
17. Jan. 1997.	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In early October 1996, Canada hosted the “Conference Towards a Global Ban on AP 
Landmines” in Ottawa.329 The Ottawa Conference was one of the first where access depended 
upon self-selection; in other words actors were only granted full participation rights if they were 
in favor of ban. This privilege was extended to the ICBL, which was allowed to serve as a full 
participant. The key point of this conference was the adoption of the Declaration of the Ottawa 
Conference, a plan outlining the steps states and NGOs were willing to take to achieve a ban. It 
was agreed that a follow-up conference would be hosted in Brussels.  
Lloyd Axworthy once again caused controversy by inviting attendees of the Ottawa 
Conference to return in less than a year to sign a ban treaty. From this point the Ottawa 
Conference became known as a “fast-track” diplomatic initiative, since it called for an 
international treaty to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of AP mines in an 
unheard of time of less than 14 months. The Declaration of the Ottawa Conference was annexed 
through the UN First Committee on Disarmament to the SG, who circulated it as an official 
document on October 16, 1996. The First Committee adopted the draft resolution, and then sent 
it to the General Assembly.  The General Assembly then adopted the resolution calling on states 
to “pursue vigorously an effective, legally binding, international agreement to ban the use, 
stockpiling, production, and transfers of AP mines with a view to completing the negotiation as 
soon as possible.”330 
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  The conference was attended by 50 participating states, 24 observer states, dozens of NGOs 
from the ICBL, various UN agencies and the ICRC (Cameron). The core group or originators of 
the ban movement, going into the conference were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, 
Mexico, Norway and Switzerland. Eventually South Africa, Germany, Philippines and the 
Netherlands joined.  
330 Canada let the US take the lead negotiator role on this resolution under the condition that it 
did not reference the CD (Resolution 51/45).	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The next formal meeting of the Ottawa Process took place in February 1997 in Vienna 
and was attended by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the Philippines, and South Africa.331 Negotiations were “closed”, but the ICBL was 
allowed to send two representatives who could participate as non-voting delegates.332 The 
government of Austria hosted this meeting to begin consultations with other states on a draft 
convention that it had developed. The Austrian delegation, having learned from the CCW 
process, made sure the point of the draft was short and straightforward in order to avoid long, 
drawn-out negotiations.333 The draft was named the Belgium Declaration in recognition that the 
next global conference would be hosted in Brussels. On March 14, 1997, Austria once again 
invited the core group of states back to Vienna to revise the text from the first meeting. When the 
final draft of this text was circulated throughout the UN, it represented the collaborative efforts 
of over 70 countries, which had either submitted comments or participated directly in the 
drafting.334  
It is important to note that not all NGOs in the ICBL were satisfied with the first draft of 
the treaty. Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), Jesuit Refugee Service and HI discovered that 
the draft contained no provisions on victim assistance. In response, the LSN utilized the services 
of the Washington-based law firm of Arnold & Porter to draft a list of provisions on victim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 South Africa was an important member because of its position of being in the most mine-
affected region in the world. Mexico was off strategic position because its proximity to the US 
allowed it to lobby the government. The Philippines was considered to be the Ottawa Process’s 
eyes and ears in Asia.  
332 Short, N. "The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines."  
333 Hajnoczi, Thomas et. al. “The Ban Treaty” in Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian 
Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. 
334 Hajnoczi, Thomas et. al. “The Ban Treaty” in Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian 
Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines.
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assistance that could be included in a treaty.335 Several governments, including South Africa, had 
stated that they would not support a final treaty that did not include victim’s assistance in some 
form. The LSN met with Axworthy, but were accused of pursuing their own agenda to the 
detriment of international efforts. 
Leading up to the conference in Brussels, the ICBL focused on building support for the 
Austrian draft. In four months, support for the Ottawa Conference had increased from 
approximately 30 countries to more than 70. A majority of African states were on board thanks 
to regional conferences hosted by NGOs. More importantly, the UK and France now supported a 
ban.336 Progress was even made in the United States, where a bipartisan bill on ‘Landmine 
Elimination’ was introduced in both houses of Congress.337 The bill never came to vote. Senator 
Leahy stated he and Senator Charles Hagel delayed the bill in order to give the administration a 
chance to change its mind and participate in the Ottawa Process.   
In late April 1997, Germany hosted The International Meeting on Possible Verification 
Measures to Ban AP mines in Bonn. The main purpose of the conference was to address 
verification procedures in the Austrian draft, which had emerged as a major point of contention. 
At this conference the ICBL played a less visible role, since their participation was dependent on 
invitations from the Austrian and German delegations. This limited access did not frustrate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 White and Rutherford. “The Role of Landmine Survivors Network” in Cameron, Maxwell, 
Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to 
Ban Landmines.  
336 Work done by NGOs had made landmines one of many election issues, and newly elected 
governments in both countries reversed the policies of their predecessors (Long, David and Laird 
Hindle. “Europe and the Ottawa Process: An Overview”).  
337 Wareham, Mary. “Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the United States” in  
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ICBL because the conference was an expert meeting; therefore no major policy decisions were 
made. 
Almost a year later in late June the official follow-up conference to the International 
Conference for a Global Ban on AP mines was held in Brussels, Belgium. The ICBL and ICRC 
used this conference to launch an aggressive campaign, focusing on previous strategies that 
target both the media and delegates. At this conference Jody William coined the phrase that 
would serve as the ICBL’s motto for the remainder of the Ottawa Process: “no exceptions, no 
reservations and no loop-holes.”338 The ICBL seemed to be successful in its mission; states that 
had previously supported the US in the CD began to shift towards the Ottawa Process, including 
Italy, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary and Bosnia.339 Many large producers, most notably Italy, 
decided that the humanitarian costs significantly outweighed the economic gain.340 The 
conference produced the Declaration for the Brussels Conference on AP mines that served as a 
political commitment that locked state signatories into the remainder of the Ottawa process. On 
July 9, 1997 the Brussels Declaration was submitted to the CD by the Belgium delegation.  
In August core group members met in Vienna to make final edits to the Austrian draft 
that would be presented as the basis of further negotiation in Oslo, Norway. Minister Axworthy 
was able to begin a dialogue with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on the issue of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Hubert, Don. 2004. “‘New’ Humanitarian Advocacy? Civil Society and the Landmines 
Treaty.” 
339 Hubert, Don. 2004. “‘New’ Humanitarian Advocacy? Civil Society and the Landmines 
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Landmines.341 Shortly after these conversations, the US signed the Brussels Declaration, thereby 
announcing their intention to participate in negotiations.342 President Clinton stated he felt that 
the US should join for diplomatic reasons; but to reassure the Joint-Chiefs, he had Albright 
announce that the US wanted five major changes to the Austrian text: (1) and exception for the 
US AP mine use in Korea, (2) a substantial change in the definition of an AP mine, (3) a delay in 
the entry-into-force of the convention, (4) a strengthened verification regime, and (5) the 
inclusion of a supreme national interest clause.  
On September 1, 1997 the Norwegian People’s AID (NPA) hosted the Diplomatic 
Conference on an International Total Ban on AP landmines in Oslo, Norway. The death of 
Princess Diana significantly increased media attention devoted to Oslo. The NPA developed 
specific negotiation procedures in order to move quickly past the existing sticking points. Areas 
of difficulty in the existing Austrian draft would be identified within the first 24-28, hours and 
then would be divided among six working groups, each of whom would be chaired by a member 
of the core group.343 Decisions could be made by a 2/3-majority vote, which should eliminate the 
difficulties associated with consensus voting. The last week of the conference would then be 
spent finalizing the draft.  
The ICBL was invited to be an official observer, allowing them to be present and make 
speeches at all sessions, including smaller working groups. While the ICBL could not make 
formal proposals for treaty language, it did circulate informal documents that included 
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suggestions for draft text. During the conference the ICBL continued its efforts to influence 
delegates’ sense of moral commitment. When delegates entered the conference, they were 
greeted by huge banners that read “no loopholes, no exceptions and no reservations.” 344 The 
ICBL developed a slogan for almost every sticking point during negotiations at Oslo. For 
example, when the US tried to alter the definition of AP mine, the ICBL distributed flyers with 
the slogan “when is an AP mine not an AP mine? - when it’s American.”345  
By the end of the second week, the US had not attained approval on its proposed 
exemptions. Most states were willing to grant the US requests for deferral, but did want to 
change the existing definition to include a “mixed-mine” system. The US requested a 24-hour 
extension to the conference in order to draft an alternative text that would include their 
exceptions, which was granted by Canada despite fervent objections by the ICBL. When this 
document could not gain support, the US withdrew its amendments and the delegates approved 
the revised Austrian text without a vote.346 During the fifty-second session of the General 
Assembly, Canada introduced the draft resolution entitled “Convention on the prohibition of the 
use, stockpiling, production and transfer of AP mines and on their destruction”. Under the 
recommendation of the First Committee, the General Assembly adopted the resolution on 
December 9, 1997.347  
Before the treaty returned to Ottawa, the ICRC launched a black-and-white public service 
announcement that showed the journey of a young female mine victim from her hut in Cambodia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: 
The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. Pg. 41 
345 Williams, Jody and Stephen Goose. “The International Campaign to Ban Landmines” in 
Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The 
Global Movement to Ban Landmines. Pg. 43 
346 Hajnoczi, Thomas et. al. “The Ban Treaty” in Cameron, Maxwell, Robert Lawson, and Brian 
Tomlin (eds). 1998. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. 
347 General Assembly Resolution 52/38	  
	   112	  
to the signing conference in Ottawa.348 Also, on October 10, 1997 it was announced that Jody 
Williams and the ICBL were the winners of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.349 Both of these events 
were designed to lead up to the Ottawa signing convention. For example, just hours after the 
award was announced, President Boris Yeltsin declared that Russia had decided to sign the 
convention. The Convention was open for signature for two days in Ottawa starting December 3, 
and on December 5 the Convention opened for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in 
New York. 
Axworthy stated that the Ottawa process offered “undeniable proof that this coalition of 
governments, NGOs, international institutions and civil society can set a global agenda and 
effect chang.”350  However, it is important to note that four of the five largest states in (terms of 
population) have not ratified the convention- China, India, the US and Russia. With the 
exception of Russia and the US, none are likely to sign soon. I argue that if pro-ban states did not 
move negotiations away from the CD, this treaty would have been blocked by these states. 
Furthermore, the ICBL would have had to play second fiddle to these more powerful states, since 
they did not allow much participation by civil society during debate.  
Jody Williams stated that the “overall message of the campaign against landmines was 
not only the damage the mines cause, but also the concept that in this post-cold-war world ‘the 
military cannot operate with impunity.”351 The three points found in the Ekos survey explain the 
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basic story, but it is a comparison to the CAT that reveals how the success of the ICBL can be 
attributed to its movement away from traditional interest group theory. Finally, it is important to 
note that a large part of ICBL’s increased access to negotiations can be merely attributed to their 
timing. The majority of negotiations in the Landmine Covention took place at the end of the 
Cold War. As described in Chapter 2, the end of the Cold War marked a movement towards 
collective and human security. There was a general understanding that international order may 
trump individual state sovereignty. NGOs as independent third parties not associated with states 
filled a natural gap in the international community to monitor abusive behavior. The information 
they gather then grants them a privileged position in negotiations.  
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Conclusion 
 Analysis of my two case studies illustrates that to understand the work of NGOs in the 
UN, one has to move away from traditional IR theory. At the end of the Cold War, the 
emergence of the idea that states had a responsibility to protect their citizens slowly began to 
erode the concept that a state is entitled to sovereignty in all matters. This concept of collective 
security served as a gateway for NGOs to negotiations; while their work often violates 
sovereignty, this was deemed acceptable since states were unable to protect the newly codified 
provisions of human security. Negotiations for the CAT occurred near the end of the Cold War, 
so it is only natural that NGOs, such as AI, had a more limited role then in the Landmines 
Convention.  
Nonetheless, AI still was relatively successful in influencing state delegations through the 
provision of information. One of the most underestimated sources of power for NGOs is their 
ability to frame the information they collect in whatever way they deem to be most effective. 
Further, AI was able to solve a common principal-agent problem in international negotiations by 
connecting state delegations to their domestic constituents. Besides differing political 
circumstances from the CAT, the ICBL was able to have more success in influencing state 
delegations in the Landmines Convention because the strategies it implemented capitalized on 
the understanding that while NGOs lack the economic and military resources associated with 
states, they did possess a moral legitimacy. It took the techniques utilized by the CAT and went 
one step further from traditional interest group theory.  
  The significance of this work is that it provides a framework of analysis that can be 
applied to other cases to illuminate the work of NGOs in international negotiations. My two case 
studies reveal a general pattern that can be used to understand how NGOs attempt to influence 
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state delegations. In the early stages NGOs should focus on building networks and raising 
awareness about the issue in the international community. Once these networks are firmly in 
place, NGOs then move towards gathering information, which will serve as the capital that will 
grant them access to negotiations. Through this information, NGOs can pressure state 
delegations and even “name and shame” abusive states into compliance to get their preferences 
represented in the final treaty. Once negotiations have begun, it is necessary for NGOs to seek a 
partnership with other member states. Further, success often depends on moving negotiations 
outside traditional methods.  
Admittedly this framework is far from perfect -- as seen in my case studies, political 
circumstances when negotiations occur often differ significantly. Nevertheless, I would be 
interested to see if this general framework still holds when transplanted to other recent human 
rights abuses. One case that comes to mind is the work done by Invisible Children in raising 
attention to the issue of child soldiers. Ironically, part of the ability to run a successful campaign 
is to not get caught up in the momentum that you are trying to build. While Invisible Children 
certainly has it faults, it cannot be denied that its marketing campaign has been incredibly 
successful. My framework allows an individual to examine a movement such as the one against 
Joseph Kony, including the techniques used to resonate with individual’s morality, while still 
being able to evaluate its success in capturing momentum to influence actors objectively.  
Of course, there were many frustrating elements to this research. Since negotiations often 
occur behind closed-doors, information was often difficult to find. I feel like I’ve barely 
scratched the surface, there is a wealth of information that whether I like or not remains closed to 
me. A lot of important debate occurs in unofficial sessions or in conversations between delegates 
during lunch or in the corridors of the UN.  Further, it is often difficult to disentangle states’ 
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actual position from what they present during negotiations. Finally, it is often difficult to verify 
that the information NGOs collect matches the situation on the ground. In essence, it is very 
difficult to avoid bias in this research. However, this is the same difficulty that all delegates 
encounter during negotiations. International negotiations are an asymmetric game, where no one 
truly has all the available information. This experience has illuminated that officials of 
organizations, both public and private, are often reluctant to cooperate with academic 
researchers.  
That being said, it is the more general overall implications of my research that most 
excites me. The first implication is that by partnering with member states, NGOs can counter 
powerful opposition forces in negotiations. Together the two actors compensate for each other’s 
weaknesses. These medium-sized states, such as Canada, possess a good reputation in the 
international community, but alone do not have the necessary resources or political clout to move 
negotiations forward. NGOs offer member states legitimacy by (1) representing those who do not 
typically have a voice in international negotiations i.e., the victims and (2) providing information 
that is often otherwise unavailable to other state delegations. As previously mentioned, this is a 
two way street, since partner states give NGOs greater legitimacy in international proceedings as 
states are seen as the dominant players. The two interest groups described in Chapter 1 may 
actually not be as conflicting as previously thought. For these movements to be successful, it 
requires connecting grassroots movement support to international proceedings, something that 
NGOs can provide states in a partnership. As Nial McDermont, a staff member of the ICJ wrote, 
“NGOs create the conditions in which governmental pressure can be effective.352  
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To conclude I return to the work of Elazar Barkan in Guilt of Nations. Was Barkan right 
in his assertion that the end of the Cold War signified a new age of morality where abusive 
behavior is no longer tolerated? This research certainly shows that the appeal of NGOs to 
delegate’s morality through both the publication of reports and visual elements are an extremely 
successful tactic when combined with a partnership with states as described above. One 
theoretical framework that this paper does not explore that could be useful for future research 
would be to apply marketing theory to the work of NGOs. However, like it or not, sovereignty 
constraints still dominate the realm of IR. States were never be completely willing to give up 
control over domestic sovereignty, for the very obvious reason that it is not in their best interests.  
I concur with the slight skepticism Barkan expresses through his agreement with Michael 
Walzer’s description of IR as “tolerant system with a very weak regime in which some member 
states (nondemocratic and totalitarian) are intolerant.”353 Nevertheless, the emergence of human 
rights agreements such as the CAT and Landmines Convention show an increased tendency 
towards cooperation between states, which in my opinion is certainly a step in the right direction. 
While, NGOs can never erase what has been done to victims such, as Mr. de la Paz or Mr. Jakic, 
hopefully their work will prevent future casualties.  
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Appendix 1 
AI= Amnesty International 
APL= Anti-Personnel Mines 
CAT= Convention Against Torture 
CD= Conference on Disarmament CRC= Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CCW= Certain Conventional Weapons  
CHR= Commission on Human Rights 
CRC= Convention on the Rights of the Child 
DONGO= Donor Organized NGO 
DPI= Department of Public Information 
ECOSOC= Economic and Social Council 
GONGOS= Government Organized NGO 
HI= Handicap International 
HRW= Human Rights Watch 
IAPL= International Association of Penal Law 
ICBL= International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
ICCPR= International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESR= International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights 
ICJ= International Commission of Jurists 
ICRC= International Committee of the Red Cross 
IGO= Intergovernmental Organization  
IR= International Relations 
Landmines Convention= Ottawa Convention for Banning Landmines 
LVA= Landmines Victim Assistance  
MAC= Mines Action Group 
MAG= Mines Advisory Group 
MI= Medico International  
NGO= Nongovernmental Organization 
OAU= Organization for African Unity 
PHR= Physicians for Human Rights 
QUANGO= Quasi Organized NGO 
R2P= Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
UN= United Nations 
USBCL= United States Campaign to Ban Landmines 
VVAF= Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation  
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Appendix 2- Interview Questions 
Delegate/Ambassador	  Version 
Background Information: Does NGO participation within human rights negotiations change 
the bargaining outcome as seen in the final version of the treaty presented for signature to 
member states? In other words, I seek to examine whether NGOs are emerging actors in their 
own right who can do more than just raise awareness and provide expert information. Focusing 
on human rights agreements (HRAs), my research will examine how the rise of NGOs within the 
UN affects the bargaining structure once all parties are at the figurative negotiation table during a 
convention. I will address this issue by conducting detailed case studies of the strategies used by 
NGOs to influence member states in the Convention Against Torture, Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines. 
 
Firstly I have just a few background questions about your position: 
 
1) What was/is your role in your delegation (ie daily activities, responsibilities, etc.)?  
 
 
2) What was/is your role during the campaign leading up to the __________________? 
 
 
Next I have more specific questions relating to your delegations role in 
_________________: 
 
1) How did the issue(s) you focused on gain prevalence within the international community and 
within your own delegation, ie how did it become part of the international agenda? 
 
2) What did your state hope to accomplish during negotiations? 
 
3) How did your delegation raise awareness (both with state officials and the general 
population) about this issue, what techniques did it use? 
 
4) How did your delegation gather and disseminate information on this subject? 
 
5) Did your delegation collaborate with any other states or NGOs during this process? 
 
6) What strategies did your delegation use to influence other member state delegations? 
 
7) How would you characterize the success of your delegation in achieving its goals during this 
movement? 
 
 
After answering these questions, if possible, I would appreciate having a 15-20 minutes 
phone conversation with you to discuss a few follow-up questions. Thank you very much 
for your time and insights. These interviews will greatly assist me in the process of 
completing my senior thesis.  
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NGO Official Version 
 
Background Information: Does NGO participation within human rights negotiations change 
the bargaining outcome as seen in the final version of the treaty presented for signature to 
member states? In other words, I seek to examine whether NGOs are emerging actors in their 
own right who can do more than just raise awareness and provide expert information. Focusing 
on human rights agreements (HRAs), my research will examine how the rise of NGOs within the 
UN affects the bargaining structure once all parties are at the figurative negotiation table during a 
convention. I will address this issue by conducting detailed case studies of the strategies used by 
NGOs to influence member states in the Convention Against Torture, Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines. 
 
Firstly I have just a few background questions about your position: 
 
1) What is your role in your organization (ie daily activities, responsibilities, etc.)?  
 
 
2) What was your role during the campaign leading up to the __________________? 
 
 
Next I have more specific questions relating to your organizations role in 
_________________: 
 
1) How did the issue(s) you focused on gain prevalence within the international community and 
within your own organization, ie how did it become part of the international agenda? 
 
2) What did your organization hope to accomplish during negotiations? 
 
3) How did your organization raise awareness (both with state officials and the general 
population) about this issue, what techniques did it use? 
 
4) How did your organization gather and disseminate information on this subject? 
 
5) Did your organization collaborate with any other states or NGOs during this process? 
 
6) What strategies did your organization use to influence other member state delegations? 
 
7) How would you characterize the success of your organization in achieving its goals during 
this movement? 
 
After answering these questions, if possible, I would appreciate having a 15-20 minutes 
phone conversation with you to discuss a few follow-up questions. Thank you very much 
for your time and insights on this subject. These interviews will greatly assist me in the 
process of completing my senior thesis.  
 
